The result of the action depended upon gunnery efficiency, as there was no ship on either side which was not thoroughly vulnerable to the guns used. And though our gunnery was (as also at Santiago) far below the present high standard, the result was positive proof of great superiority to that of the Spanish.
The Americans had two officers and six men wounded in the Baltimore. Otherwise they were scathless. The Spanish loss, as reckoned by “painstaking inquiry” by an American officer, was 167 killed and 214 wounded. Admiral Montojo’s own statement, which puts his whole force at but 1,134, was 75 killed and 281 wounded.
Dewey cut and buoyed the cable on May 2d, took position in the bay, and awaited the coming of troops which were soon to be on their way. He sent the revenue cutter McCulloch, which had taken no part in the action, to telegraph his victory home. Before he had cut the cable, however, the news had been telegraphed to Madrid, and it was thence received on May 2d with great enthusiasm in the United States. On May 10th Dewey received the thanks of Congress and was raised to the rank of Admiral of the Navy.
While the victory was to have great results in determining our attitude toward the Philippines, it could in no sense determine the result of the war; this could only be attained by the destruction of one or the other battle fleets now in the Atlantic. The event, however, put a very different complexion upon the attitude of Europe. There was to be no further European talk of putting limitations upon our conduct of the struggle.
CHAPTER XXIII
Naval action now shifts almost entirely to the Caribbean. Until in the last days of the war there was to be in the Pacific no further special naval movement beyond the seizure of Guam by the Charleston on June 11th and the sending to Manila the monitors Monterey and Monadnock to reinforce Dewey. The first of the army sailed from San Francisco on May 28th.
The departure of Cervera from the Cape Verdes caused Admiral Sampson to move from Havana east 970 miles to San Juan, Puerto Rico, with the expectancy of finding there the Spanish fleet. This move was based upon the view that as it was but from 1,200 to 1,400 miles from San Juan to important points on our coast, it was an absolute necessity to make sure that if the Spanish squadron arrived there it should not be allowed to leave and be free to raid our seaboard. Sampson’s prescience was right. Cervera’s orders were to go there and then do as he thought best. Had he not himself been so slow in crossing the Atlantic, Sampson would have found him at San Juan, and the Spanish fleet would have been destroyed on May 12th instead of July 3d.
Continuous breakdowns of the two monitors accompanying Sampson caused such delay that his squadron was not off San Juan until May 12th. An attack on the fortifications began at 5 A.M., and continued for three hours, when Sampson withdrew with no damage to the ships and with the loss of one man killed and four wounded aboard the New York. As Cervera was clearly not in port, and as it was necessary not to risk overmuch the American ships before he could be met, it was thought inadvisable to continue the action, though as known later the place was ready to surrender to another attack. As Cervera was much overdue and no word had as yet been received of his whereabouts, the American squadron stood west (with a view to covering Havana), sending into St. Thomas, only sixty miles to the east, for news.
It was not until in the early morning of May 15th, off Puerto Plata, that word came of Cervera’s having reached Curaçao. At the same time a dispatch from Washington was received by Sampson informing him that the Flying Squadron was en route to Key West and directing Sampson himself to proceed there with all possible dispatch.