Cervera had arrived off Martinique on the evening of May 11th and had sent in a destroyer for news, which brought next morning the word of Sampson’s being off Puerto Rico. Unable now to go to San Juan without meeting the American fleet, a council of war was called, and on its decision Cervera shaped his course for Curaçao in search of coal, leaving the destroyer Terror, whose boilers had given out, at Martinique. Leaving Curaçao in the evening of May 15th, he entered the harbor of Santiago de Cuba at dawn on May 19th.

Sampson was now, as mentioned, standing at full speed for Key West. It is very remarkable that he had the same instinct as to Cervera’s second destination as to his first; as in a telegram to the scout Harvard (the New York of the American line of steamers) he mentioned Santiago or San Juan as the ports likely to be entered. The peremptory orders from Washington left no freedom of action, however, and on May 18th Key West was reached. There were found the ships of the Flying Squadron, the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas, just arrived from Hampton Roads and coaling.

On May 11th, the day before Sampson’s attack at San Juan, there were two affairs of great gallantry: the one the cable-cutting at Cienfuegos; the other an action at Cardenas. The former was carried out by two sailing launches for lifting and cutting the cables and two steam launches carrying marines to “stand off” the Spaniards. The Marblehead and Nashville kept up a fire against the forces entrenched on the edge of the low bluff which finally had to be approached within 150 feet before the work was accomplished. Grappling for the cables was long and tedious, and the operation of sawing through each took nearly half an hour. To perform such work under a constant fire from the Spaniards in trenches not more than 200 yards away showed a cool courage of which Americans can be proud. The boats were back to their ships in a little over three hours, with two killed and seven wounded, one of the latter being Lieutenant Winslow in command.

The action on the same day at Cardenas on the north side of Cuba, but seventy-five miles from Cienfuegos by land, but 500 by sea, was between the Wilmington, the Machias, the revenue cutter Hudson, and the torpedo boat Winslow against three Spanish gunboats which lay well within the harbor in water which could not be entered by our heavier draft vessels. The torpedo boat, which of course was never intended for such service, ventured in too far and was severely handled. Ensign Bagley and four of the men were killed, and three, one being Lieutenant Bernadou in command, were wounded. The Winslow, wholly disabled, was towed out of her dangerous position by the intrepid handling of the Hudson.

We return to Key West, where all was movement to take measures to intercept Cervera.

The Navy Department had become convinced from information received that Cervera had imperative orders to go either to Cienfuegos or Havana to land material necessary for the defence of Havana, and urged the utmost dispatch in blockading both ports. Thus next morning, May 19th, Commodore Schley sailed with the three ships of his squadron mentioned, to be followed next day by the Iowa, our newest battleship of the time, and which reached Cienfuegos only seven hours after Commodore Schley. There followed the torpedo boat Dupont, the collier Merrimac, the cruisers Marblehead, Castine, and two auxiliary vessels; an ample force, should Cervera be met.

Events were now following one another with the utmost rapidity. To deal with these in detail is quite beyond our scope. One must look to the larger histories of the war for the full account of the happenings of this stirring time.[54] One can give here but a running mention of the reception on the late afternoon of May 19th of the news by the way of Havana of Cervera’s arrival that morning at Santiago de Cuba; the repetition of this news with an expression of doubt in the telegram from Washington to Sampson during that night; its verification next day, the 20th; the dispatch of the news to Schley with orders, if convinced that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos Bay,[55] to go to Santiago and blockade; Sampson’s movement 300 miles east with the rest of the fleet available into the narrow waters of Nicholas Channel, to intercept Cervera should he leave Santiago and attempt to reach Havana; the delay of Schley at Cienfuegos, not being satisfied that Cervera was not there; the final assurance that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos received from insurgents on May 24th, and the departure that evening of Commodore Schley’s squadron for Santiago; his arrival twenty-two miles south of the entrance on May 26th; Cervera’s intention (but given up through vacillation) to leave Santiago that evening at almost the same moment when Schley started with intention to return to Key West on the plea of inability to coal his ships; his change of mind on May 28th and arrival that evening off Santiago; the arrival of the Oregon at Key West on May 26th, completing her remarkable journey of 14,000 miles from the west coast; Sampson’s finally determining to go to Santiago on account of Schley’s dispatch that he could not blockade for want of coal; the recognition of the Colón in the harbor entrance on May 29th; the ineffectual attack on the Colón on May 30th; the arrival of Sampson on June 1st with the New York, Oregon, Mayflower, and torpedo boat Porter; the establishment of a close blockade; the sinking of the Merrimac in the entrance channel; the stationing every evening of a battleship with searchlights upon the harbor entrance; the occupancy of Guantánamo Bay; the driving off, by the battalion of marines established there in camp, of the Spanish troops in the vicinity; the frequent bombardment of the Spanish batteries at Santiago entrance; the arrival on June 20th of the army under General Shafter; its debarkation and movement against Santiago; the attack of July 1st on El Caney and San Juan Hill; the sortie of Cervera’s squadron; its destruction: these are but the chief events of the many which happened between May 18th and July 3d. On the forenoon of Sunday, this latter date, was decided the fate of Spain in America.

More than half the crews of the Spanish ships had been used ashore on July 1st in the defence of Santiago, and the commander of these, Captain Bustamante, Cervera’s chief-of-staff, had, to the great grief of all who knew him both in the Spanish and American services, been mortally wounded. Cervera had, after the battle of July 1st, received orders to leave the harbor and endeavor to save his squadron. He and his captains accepted the situation with calm courage and prepared to leave the evening of July 2d. The slow work of returning the crews aboard ship caused delay until the next morning.

At 9:30 the crews of the American ships were just falling in for the usual Sunday “inspection.” The admiral had started a little before nine in the New York under easy steam to arrange with General Shafter a plan of combined attack. The New York had gone about five miles when a shot was heard from the battery at the entrance and a ship almost immediately after seen coming out. The New York at once turned.

In accord with the admiral’s standing order, all the ships immediately started to close in on the entrance. The flagship Infanta Maria Teresa, which was the ship first sighted, was naturally exposed for some little time to the fire of all, and was quickly a mass of flames and heading in for the land. She was run ashore about six miles west of the harbor entrance; the Oquendo, though she was the last of the large ships to come out, was beached, also burning, soon after the Maria Teresa, about a quarter of a mile west of the latter; the Vizcaya, afire, went on to the reef fifteen miles west of Santiago about 11:30, shortly after which her forward magazine exploded. The destroyer Furor had been sunk, and the Pluton was ashore destroyed, having made only three miles to the west. The Colón only was left, in full flight and practically uninjured, pursued by the Oregon, Brooklyn, New York, and Texas. At 1:15 she turned ashore, the 13-inch shell of the Oregon, fired at 9,000 yards, going over her. Her sea-valves had been opened, and though she was pushed on to the beach stern foremost by the New York, her bow overhung into deep water and as she filled she turned on her side. She was never raised. The heroic efforts of the American crews in saving life from the burning ships are deserving every praise.