[13] “The Spanish Commander-in-Chief fled from the city shortly before it was attacked.” Senate Document 62, Part II., 55th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 146.
[14] Barasoain is another parish, but it is only separated from Malolos by a bridged river. It is only five minutesʼ walk from Malolos Church to Barasoain Church. Since the American advent the two parishes have been united.
[15] For want of space I am obliged to omit the summary of all the debates in the Revolutionary Congress of 1898, printed reports of which I have before me.
[16] Vide Senate Document No. 62, Part II., 55th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 371. Published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, 1899.
[17] Vide Senate Document No. 62, Part I. of the 55th Congress, 3rd Session. Published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, 1899.
An Outline of the War of Independence, Period 1899–1901
“I speak not of forcible annexation because that is not to be thought of, and under our code of morality that would be criminal aggression.”—President McKinleyʼs Message to Congress; December, 1897.
“The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana by purchase, or Texas or Alaska.”—President McKinleyʼs Speech to the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment; August 28, 1899.
Ignorance of the worldʼs ways, beyond the Philippine shores, was the cause of the Aguinaldo partyʼs first disappointment. A score of pamphlets has been published to show how thoroughly the Filipinos believed Americaʼs mission to these Islands to be solely prompted by a compassionate desire to aid them in their struggle for immediate sovereign independence. Laudatory and congratulatory speeches, uttered in British colonies, in the presence of American officials, and hope-inspiring expressions which fell from their lips before Aguinaldoʼs return to Cavite from exile, strengthened that conviction. Sympathetic avowals and grandiloquent phrases, such as “for the sake of humanity,” and “the cause of civilization,” which were so freely bandied about at the time by unauthorized Americans, drew Aguinaldo into the error of believing that some sort of bond really existed between the United States and the Philippine Revolutionary Party. In truth, there was no agreement between America and the Filipinos. There was no American plenipotentiary empowered to make any political compact with the Islanders. At that date there was neither a Philippine policy nor any fixed programme regarding the future disposal of the Islands, and whatever naval, military, or other officers might have said to Aguinaldo was said on their own private responsibility, and could in no way affect the action of the American Government. Without any training in or natural bent for diplomacy, Aguinaldo had not the faintest idea of what foreign “protection” signified. He thought that after the capture of Manila the Americans would sail away and leave the Filipinos to themselves, and only reappear if any other Power interfered with their native government.
