Bowie-knives and Weapons of the Christian Natives.
Central figure—“Talibon.” The others—Bowie-knives (Sp. Bolo, Tag. Guloc).
Admiral Dewey had a double task to perform. He had to destroy the Spanish fleet, and to co-operate in the taking of Manila. In the destruction of the fleet the attitude of the natives was of little concern to him. In the taking of the capital it was important to know what part the natives would play. It was certain they would not be placid spectators of the struggle, wherever Aguinaldo might be. If they must enter into it, it was desirable to have them led by one who could control them and repress excesses. It would have been better for the Americans if, pending the issue with the Spaniards, no third party had existed; but, as it did exist, both contending nations were anxious for its goodwill or its control. Therefore Admiral Deweyʼs recognition of Aguinaldo as a factor in the hostilities was nothing more nor less than a legitimate stratagem to facilitate his operations against the Spaniards. Dewey simply neutralized a possible adverse force by admissible military artifice, and Aguinaldo was too ingenuous to see that he was being outwitted. The fighting section of the Filipinos was intensely irritated at not having been allowed to enter and sack the capital. They had looked forward to it as the crowning act of victory. The general mass of the christianized Islanders hoped that Philippine independence would immediately follow the capitulation of Manila, although, in the capital itself, natives of position and property evinced little enthusiasm for the insurgentsʼ triumph, whilst some inwardly doubted it. In September a native lawyer, Felipe Agoncillo, was sent to Washington to lay the Filipinosʼ case before the President in the hope of gaining his personal support of their claims (vide p. [472]). The first fear was that the Colony might revert to Spain, but that idea was soon dispelled by the news of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. Simultaneously Aguinaldoʼs revolutionary army was being pushed farther and farther away from the capital, and it was evident, from the mood of his fighting-men, that if the Americans remained in possession of the Colony, hostilities, sooner or later, must break out. The Americans officially ignored the Aguinaldo party as a factor in public affairs, but they were not unaware of the warlike preparations being made. Secret anti-American meetings were held at places called clubs, where it was agreed to attack simultaneously the Americans inside and outside the capital. General Pio del Pilar slept in the city every night, ready to give the rocket-signal for revolt. Natives between 18 and 40 years of age were being recruited for military service, according to a Malolos Government decree dated September 21, 1898. In every smithy and factory bowie-knives were being forged with all speed, and 10,000 men were already armed with them. General E. S. Otis was willing to confer with Aguinaldo, and six sessions were held, the last taking place on January 29, six days before the outbreak. Nothing resulted from these conferences, the Americans alleging that Aguinaldo would make no definite statement of his peopleʼs aims, whilst the Filipinos declare that their intentions were so well understood by the American general that he would listen to nothing short of unconditional submission.
The following manifesto, dated January 5, signed by Emilio Aguinaldo, clearly shows the attitude of the Revolutionary Party at this period:—
To My Brethren the Filipinos, and to All the Respected Consuls and Other Foreigners:—
General Otis styles himself Military Governor of these Islands, and I protest one and a thousand times and with all the energy of my soul against such authority. I proclaim solemnly that I have not recognized either in Singapore or in Hong-Kong or in the Philippines, by word or in writing, the sovereignty of America over this beloved soil. On the contrary, I say that I returned to these Islands on an American warship on the 19th of May last for the express purpose of making war on the Spaniards to regain our liberty and independence. I stated this in my proclamation of the 24th of May last, and I published it in my Manifesto addressed to the Philippine people on the 12th of June. Lastly, all this was confirmed by the American General Merritt himself, predecessor of General Otis, in his Manifesto to the Philippine people some days before he demanded the surrender of Manila from the Spanish General Jaúdenes. In that Manifesto it is distinctly stated that the naval and field forces of the United States had come to give us our liberty, by subverting the bad Spanish Government. And I hereby protest against this unexpected act of the United States claiming sovereignty over these Islands. My relations with the American authorities prove undeniably that the United States did not bring me over here from Hong-Kong to make war on the Spaniards for their benefit, but for the purpose of our own liberty and independence. . . .
Emilio Aguinaldo.
Aguinaldo having been successively Dictator and President of the Revolutionary Government (vide p. [448]), now assumed the new title of President of the Philippine Republic, the Articles of Constitution of which (drawn up by his Prime Minister Apolinario Mabini) were dated January 21, 1899, and promulgated by him on the following day. In due course the news came that the date of voting in the Senate for or against the retention of the Islands was fixed. The Americans already in the Colony were practically unanimous in their desire for its retention, and every effort was made by them to that end. The question of the treaty ratification was warmly discussed in Washington. A week before the vote was taken it was doubtful whether the necessary two-thirds majority could be obtained. It was a remarkable coincidence that just when the Republican Party was straining every nerve to secure the two or three wavering votes, the first shots were exchanged between a native and an American outpost in the suburbs of the capital. Each side accuses the other of having precipitated hostilities. However that may be, this event took place precisely at a date when the news of it in Washington served to secure the votes of the hesitating senators in favour of retention.[1] The provocative demeanour of the insurgents at the outposts was such that a rupture was inevitable sooner or later, and if a Senate vote of abandonment had come simultaneously with insurrection, the situation would have been extremely complicated; it would have been difficult for the Oriental not to have believed that the invader was nervously beating a retreat. The Nebraska Regiment was at Santa Mesa, guarding its front. Americans were frequently insulted, called cowards, and openly menaced by the insurgents. In the evening of Saturday, February 4, 1899, an insurgent officer came with a detail of men and attempted to force his way past the sentinel on the San Juan bridge. About nine oʼclock a large body of rebels advanced on the South Dakota Regimentʼs outposts, and to avoid the necessity of firing, for obvious reasons, the picquets fell back. For several nights a certain insurgent lieutenant had tried to pass the Nebraska lines. At length he approached a sentinel, who called “halt” three times without response, and then shot the lieutenant dead. Several insurgents then fired and retreated; rockets were at once sent up by the Filipinos, and firing started all along the line, from Caloocan to Santa Mesa. By ten oʼclock the Filipinos concentrated at Caloocan, Santa Mesa, and Gagalan͠ging, whence they opened a simultaneous, but ineffectual, fusillade, supplemented by two siege guns at Balichalic and a skirmishing attack from Pandacan and Paco. Desperate fighting continued throughout the night; the Filipinos, driven back from every post with heavy loss, rallied the next morning at Paco, where they occupied the parish church, to which many non-combatant refugees had fled. The American warships, co-operating with their batteries, poured a terrific fire on the church, and kept up a continuous attack on the insurgent position at Caloocan, where General Aguinaldo was in command. At daylight the Americans made a general advance towards Paco and Santa Ana. At the former place the Filipinos resisted desperately; the church, sheltering refugees and insurgents, was completely demolished;[2] the Filipinosʼ loss amounted to about 4,000 killed and wounded, whilst the Americans lost about 175 killed and wounded. It is estimated that the approximate number of troops engaged in this encounter was 13,000 Americans and 20,000 Filipinos. The insurgents at Santa Ana, the survivors of the Paco defeat, and the force which had to abandon the Santólan water-works, where they left behind them a howitzer, all concentrated at Caloocan. The insurgent and American lines formed a semicircle some 15 miles in extent, making it impossible to give a comprehensive description of the numerous small engagements.
Immediately the news of the rupture reached Washington the Philippine Envoy, Felipe Agoncillo, fled to Montreal, Canada, in a great hurry, leaving his luggage behind. No one was troubling him, and there was not the least need for such a precipitate flight from a country where civilized international usages obtain. On February 5 an engagement took place at Gagalan͠ging, where the natives collected in the hundreds of bungalows around that village awaiting the advance of the Oregon Regiment. Amongst the spectators was the German Prince Ludwig von Löwenstein. The Americans continued advancing and firing, when suddenly the prince ran across an open space and took shelter in a hut which he must have known would be attacked by the Oregons. The order was given to fire into the native dwellings giving cover to the insurgents, and the princeʼs dead body was subsequently found perforated by a bullet. In his pocket he carried a pass issued by Aguinaldo conceding to the bearer permission to go anywhere within the insurgent lines, and stating that he was a sympathizer with their cause. It was noticed that the prince several times deliberately threw himself into danger. No one could ascertain exactly in what capacity he found himself near the fighting-line. Less than two years previously he had married the daughter of an English earl, and the popular belief was that, for private reasons, he intentionally courted death.