Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seems to me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly count on seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile we must search for expedients.

From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the period allotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such a degree that Field-Service days can be interposed between the drill days, in which at least the combined action of masses within the limits of Field-Service exercises can be practised.

The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrifice a part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in the interest of the proposed strategic manœuvres, and whether the advantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any rate partially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to a certain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up our minds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the present exercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed in groups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carried out without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are so managed that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters, during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very small cost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not at all necessary to carry them through to their culmination in an engagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, when necessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery for reconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation, the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonable limits.

An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regiments in Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those in Saarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forces are constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by which each element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screen covering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night the points at which they are actually quartered. The distances of the places named one from another are such that they fairly represent a possible situation in War, and a single day's march might well bring them into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could easily be found in the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and the Infantry in the respective garrisons might represent the heads of the following Armies' columns without undue interference with their programme of training. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons only per regiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train, the point being not so much the number of such waggons provided as the service loading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night preceding the march, outposts could be established, and the service of exploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercise for the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low cost and with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally be conducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the example shows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easily organized.[30]

Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into account the numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in future Warfare, it would be a great gain to the Arm if in the manœuvres, in which its action in combination with the other Arms should be taught, this point of view was brought more into the foreground.

Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Arms should be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather is whether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; the importance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background, and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses.' Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficiently practised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising the large units are far more difficult to find.

I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms if present Brigade manœuvres, with all their superannuated customs, were abolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps manœuvres. The Cavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its point of view these manœuvres could be made far more practical, and it would be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in accordance with reality.

It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry should have opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action on a grand scale. At present these only arise in the manœuvres with mixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry manœuvres they are difficult of representation.

The Director of the manœuvres can also do much to make the operations instructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the interests of all engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon the Cavalry are kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens that patrols are despatched at far too late an hour to make it possible for their reports to arrive in time. Commanders, again, frequently wish to be informed as to the exact position of every battalion on the other side, although they generally know his total force with accuracy, or they want to know the exact strength of the Garrison holding a certain village or locality, as if Cavalry could under any circumstances supply such information; and if at night no sketch of the enemy's outpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are held to have failed in their duty. All these demands are, in my opinion, entirely unpractical; in War one never has such precise information, and no rational man dreams of wasting the strength of his Cavalry in endeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere remnants of the Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme case when perhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly unpractical to require under all circumstances complete information as to the progress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is impossible, unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not merely are such demands unpractical, but they exercise a most prejudicial effect, for too accurate and too detailed information gets the Generals into bad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is well-nigh ruined. Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men must not be afraid to keep well up to the enemy, and bring back intelligence even out of the zone of his fire; but, generally, reliable observations are only made out of range. The Cavalry must learn principally to judge the enemy's arrangements from a distance; they must direct their attention to the essential only, and not waste their time in unnecessary side issues. If justice is to be done to these requirements, it is quite impossible to collect all the information the Generals so frequently require. Thus they get in the habit of observing in an unpractical manner, and the whole of this most important branch of their education suffers accordingly. So much is this the case that nowadays the patrol leaders often exchange mutual confidences to one another, as it is practically impossible, owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain the required information otherwise, and they consider it better to get it in this manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats of riding.

Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the training when kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates.