Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic element in which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is the constant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of the enemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning element in which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work, and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in our Peace-time training.[Back to Contents]

CHAPTER VI

THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS

The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess inexhaustible activity of mind and body.

If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various problems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increased amount of military knowledge and executive ability.

The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above, and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness, and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be reported—deductions will not be drawn. There will be no discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform. They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to determine the most important points and directions in which to follow up any available clue.

If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, he should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point to direct his further advance.

If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.

Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all points to the same conclusion—viz., that a comprehensive military education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the future.

Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only—the point was to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence, seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction in which the troops they saw were moving—a matter of most vital importance—or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were all moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily have ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus, because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence—the actual position of the French right flank—could not be determined until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have repeated themselves times without number.