Their execution, however, will always encounter many difficulties, particularly when a hostile population has to be dealt with; but to consider them on this account as impracticable seems to me all the more impossible, because to my mind they embody an absolutely indispensable element of future operations.
If it is feasible to enter upon them with fresh horses, and to make adequate provision for supply without delaying the rapidity of movement, either by utilizing the resources of the country, by taking suitably organized columns with one, or by living on stores captured from the enemy himself, then such 'raids' will succeed and exercise most far-reaching consequences.
In my opinion all these conditions can be satisfied. We can preserve our horses by exercising greater moderation in the pursuit of non-essentials; difficulties of supply can be solved by suitable preparations even in an enemy's country, and when working in our own, the sympathetic and persistent support of our own population will level all obstacles; but in all cases we must never leave out of sight the cardinal point that only the concentration of sufficient force at the right time and place can guarantee the final result.
Our conduct, however, will be different when our purpose is solely defensive, or when we have to occupy districts which the enemy does not seek to defend. In such cases, as also when our object is only the concealment of our own designs, a dispersion of force may be necessary, if only in order to occupy important defiles and defensive sections of the ground, or for the occupation of the most important centres of population in the enemy's country. From such tasks, however, it should be the business of the Supreme Command to preserve us, in order that the whole Cavalry strength should be retained intact for offensive purposes more in harmony with its whole character and the spirit of the Arm.
For these, if great results are to be attained, it requires in the generality of cases concentration in time and space.
With the execution of these strategical missions, which so far alone have attracted our attention, the duties of the Cavalry Arm are by no means exhausted.
Nowadays, as formerly, it will still find work to its hands on the battle-field itself, and this work will be all the more important in proportion as the quality of the forces therein encountered is on a lower level (e.g., new formations, Militia, etc.). In any case, however, great results on the battle-field can only be expected from the employment of numerically formidable 'Masses.' This is conditioned by the very fact of the numbers which we must in future expect to see engaged.
The portion of the enemy's forces affected by the results of a successful charge must be a sufficient part of the whole which, at a given time and place, is concerned in the task of endeavouring to secure a decision.
Other factors also deserve consideration—above all, the increased range of modern firearms. If the front of the attacking Cavalry is too narrow, it will not only have to face the fire of the troops immediately in its front, but it will be the focus of the fire from all sides.
If the formation for attack does not supply a sufficient sequence of successive efforts, then in many cases it can have no hope of permanent result, for an onslaught by a single line will not have strength enough to pierce the fire zone, and will be shot to pieces before it can reach the enemy.[2]