The masses to be encountered are numerically so considerable that single squadrons, regiments, or brigades, hardly count in the scale of a great decision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but to bring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an important fraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a great retreat, numbers alone can avail.
How many units to employ under any given circumstances it is, of course, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of the matter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excess of what any existing tactical unit can supply.
If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open to horsemen in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks in the future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in the organization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not be able to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handling of the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Charges even of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can only lead to success under very special conditions, and even for the protection of a retreat our rôle can only be a subordinate one. But for reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy's communications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similar operations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the principal Arm. Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisite mobility and independence.
At the same time, it is in these fields that its power is all-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure of necessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results even partially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orders without knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible to act against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone.
It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it is to fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy in peace.[Back to Contents]
CHAPTER III
STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY
We have seen in the previous chapter that the principal duties which can fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require its employment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatest economy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must be practised.
This leads us to the consideration of the question in what manner we can group our available means to meet these requirements in the best possible way.
Primarily we must start from this axiom—that no portion of the Army can do without Cavalry altogether; hence it follows that we must maintain both Divisional and independent Cavalry.