Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

The former remains permanently attached to each portion of the Army whose composition, by reason of this addition of Cavalry, permits of independent action. The latter is set aside for the great strategical missions that may be assigned to that Arm, for execution. The question now arises, In what proportion is this distribution to take place?

The greater number of Infantry Divisions can, in my opinion, meet all demands upon them with a very small allotment of mounted men, as long as they are acting in combination with the rest of the Army.

The circulation of intelligence and orders within the columns and their outposts can generally be entrusted to cyclists. Where independent Cavalry is deployed to cover the front of an army, the field of activity for the Divisional Cavalry in actual outpost duties and reconnaissance is of necessity very much limited. All they are really required to accomplish is to maintain the connection with the former, and for this duty the cyclist detachments above referred to will generally suffice.

There remains, therefore, for the Divisional Cavalry only the service with the most advanced sections of the Infantry outposts (orderly duties with the Infantry piquets in cases where the ground precludes the use of the cycle), duties connected with requisitioning; and reconnaissance only during those periods in which the mass of the independent Cavalry has been drawn away towards the wings of the Army to clear its front for battle, carrying messages during the combat, and actual reconnaissance during the progress of the engagement itself. All these requirements can, I think, be met with a very small amount of force, all the more so because reconnaissance under fire in modern War seems to me practically impossible, and can generally only be initiated by those Divisions which form the wings of the Army, but even then their field would be a very limited one.

Modern firearms compel us to remain at such a distance from the enemy that observation is rendered much more difficult, and the distances to be traversed are so great that before any reports from the wings can get round to the position of Headquarters, and suitable orders based on these reports can reach their destination, the whole situation may have changed again and again. We have only to remember the cases which occurred in the last War (1870).

In the majority of these instances it was quite impossible that Cavalry patrols could have sent timely information of what was going on within the limits of the enemy's positions, and in the future the difficulties will be even greater.

In no case, however, can such information during the progress of an action be obtained by the actual employment of the fighting power of the Divisional Cavalry.

If it is to be done at all, then a few well-led officers patrols will suffice, and therefore no considerable numerical strength in the Divisional Cavalry is required. The lines of approach of the enemy and points on which his wings are resting must certainly be kept under observation, but this observation cannot in principle be initiated by the Infantry Divisions, but it is the province of the Army Headquarters to provide, for it will be precisely the wings and the flanks which the enemy will himself seek to protect by the massing of his own Cavalry.

If the prospect of achieving anything by observation during the combat through the action of the Divisional Cavalry may be considered as well-nigh impossible, then any tactical action may also be considered as precluded, unless it takes place in combination with the independent Cavalry.

Occasions may certainly even nowadays occur in which a few squadrons may achieve results by taking part in a combat between the other Arms, but such cases are too few and unimportant to be taken into account in a distribution of the Cavalry as a matter of organization.