Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front will have to manœuvre; or it must close in from a flank for the decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination. But they must always endeavour—and here I differ from General von Schlichting—to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in rear of the general alignment—as, for instance, it is proposed to use them as a last resort in the interests of the other Arms, as at Mars la Tour—or where the battle front itself is broken up by the nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such manner that the whole engagement is divided into a series of individual actions, as may often be the case in future Wars, that this rule must be departed from.

Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its fullest opportunity.

That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and particular circumstances of the moment.

The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the Cavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank, and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.

General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally superfluous—a kind of family concern which affects the rival Cavalries only—having no connection with the ultimate decision between the two armies.[11]

I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly on peace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generally neutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usually opens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results. I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, but that the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out from the first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can open the door for further successful action against his other troops; otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Mars la Tour.

If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock has supervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportant on the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has always been due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combat to its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Mars la Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force nor cohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitz and at Prague.

Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is really adequate to its duties—when it not only beats the enemy out of the field, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further efforts in pursuit.

To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and never rest satisfied, as on the plateau of Ville sur Yron (Mars la Tour), with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to gallop and handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his horse must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is no true 'Cavalry Soldier.'

If we have successfully achieved this first result—i.e., victory over the enemy's horsemen—then the next step is to secure rapid rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.