Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.

It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his horsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own activity—a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be expected—and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces before such opportunity arrives.

For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it implies cannot be disregarded, and will compel him to find means to rid himself of such embarrassment.

Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each Division retains full space for deployment and room to manœuvre for the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.

It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for action towards the front than, under the circumstances of the battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the troops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet a coming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessity of gaining room for deployment,[12] the opportunity to strike will be lost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to the troops being put in without order and in confusion.

The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whether Corps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field, preserving always their full deploying intervals.

Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above all things the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in the shape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actual facts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation to be assumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clear in one's own mind as to which disposition to adopt and the consequences which must follow from one's choice.

The chief difficulty always remains—viz., the chance of seizing the opportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solve the problem, and in the subsequent course of the War—particularly against the forces of the Republic—it might often have obtained far better results had it possessed a clearer conception of its mission and better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action at Coulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity.

The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range of firearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is it that we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of our tactical power and its limitations, and it is above all things necessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not shirk even heavy punishment if by so doing we can best secure opportunities for great results.

If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requires to have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He must be able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General the general course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and the gradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers.