Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

If, in the shock between mounted men, the genius of the Leader is the principal factor of success, nevertheless, the successful conduct of a dismounted combat and of all the variations this form of action may assume make almost equal demands upon his capacity. For the timely recognition of opportunities which can only be turned to account by recourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action to another, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismounted engagement, require such a complete command of the situation and such certainty of military judgment and decision of character that the combination will be almost as rarely found.

Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow the troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the Cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal natures.

The essential point which differentiates the action of Cavalry fighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation is the dependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that under all circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot to their means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once the most important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot of the Leader.

Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile or immobile horses,[13] and in every case the question arises how the conditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best be dealt with.

Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action, consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance is made with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses can be led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue the prosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fight with 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successes with the same body of troops with which such success has been won. Either the position which has been captured must be retained for some considerable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left, at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk of intervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neither operation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit.

On the whole, in attack the difficulty is best met by working with 'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in the fighting line can then be provided by dismounting men from a larger number of units—Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades.

From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to the proximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it is absolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, or when it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the 'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for the appointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapid attainment of fire superiority must be striven for under all circumstances.

If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion must be the exact converse.

The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective, and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by the very conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive rôle in the first instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround a defensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, it is usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firing line, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack, constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser to adopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition.

This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a larger mounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, and one should only depart from this principle when special circumstances make it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of the fire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses far behind the actual shooting line of the position.