Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments, the Commander must decide how far away from the actual field of action he should dismount his men.

Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as close as possible to the line to be held or the position from whence the advance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is only set by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for the led horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure that the men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from a distance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire of Artillery must not be left out of consideration altogether in the solution of this question.

Hence, it can only happen very rarely, and then only under exceptionally favourable topographical conditions, that a suitable position for the led horses can be found in immediate proximity to the actual line of action.

We may, however, be less particular when, in fairly favourable country, it is advisable to engage, without the intention of courting a decision, our object being only to annoy the enemy by sudden fire, disappearing again as soon as he retaliates, or when one is reasonably certain of success, as against inferior or badly shaken troops.

But when such favourable conditions are not present, and a tactical repulse is always possible, then the place for the led horses can only be found so far to the rear that the enemy cannot take us under fire whilst in the act of remounting, and circumstances render it improbable that this emergency can arise before we have succeeded in breaking off fighting contact with the enemy.

The Commander, therefore, who decides to undertake a serious fire action must be perfectly clear in his own mind that by the act of dismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a very considerable time; for if the enemy's resistance proves more obstinate than originally anticipated, and it becomes clear that the original purpose is not to be attained with the available means, the expectation that after once engaging the enemy the fight can be broken off and the horses remounted will in most cases prove entirely illusory.

Since this operation of discontinuing a fire combat is most difficult to carry through, even for Infantry, the dangers are immensely greater for mounted men, owing to the added complication of their led horses. Only the passivity of the enemy, or unusually favourable topographical conditions, as in South Africa, can alter the general soundness of this conclusion; and it is entirely impracticable to escape these consequences by any attempt to lay down a limit and distance beyond which the fight is not to be prosecuted, in the hope that by so doing we can safely break off a combat once commenced. Generally it must be accepted, as laid down in Cavalry Regulations, Sections 362 and 364, that a fire action once accepted must be carried out to the end, unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flanks makes its interruption possible.

One must never, therefore, in reliance on this possibility of withdrawal, allow one's self to be led into the mistake of keeping the led horses too close at hand; but the resolution to engage in a dismounted action must always involve measures which fully recognise the serious possibilities such decision entails, and must be on a scale which will insure the necessary vigour of execution.

Hence, since in all cases in which a serious dismounted combat is absolutely necessary it is essential that the horses should be left in the greatest attainable security, the place for them should be selected in such a manner that they are protected against possible turning movements by the enemy—that is to say, behind suitable shelter provided by the ground, or behind defiles that can be easily defended. In cases in which these conditions cannot be complied with, which in practice will often arise, their security must be provided for by a sufficient reserve of mounted men, particularly when the enemy's Cavalry is in the vicinity, for 'immobile' detachments are practically at the mercy of every mounted patrol; and as a further precaution it will be well to spread around them a sufficient web of reconnoitring and security patrols, and to arrange for the support of one's own batteries.

The covering of the led horses, however, is not the only duty of the mounted reserve: the protection of the Artillery also devolves upon it, and generally it must be ready to meet any of the demands for which Reserves are usually set aside. Hence it will have to provide not only for the safety of its own side and all pertaining thereto, but it must also threaten the enemy's flanks, undertake turning movements, reinforce, if necessary, the fighting lines, pursue the enemy, or cover the possible withdrawal of its own dismounted combatants; and, further on the offensive, it is its special mission to hold the conquered ground when the dismounted detachments are called off to remount, and to continue to carry on the original mission, interrupted by the combat, until relieved by the men who in the meanwhile have regained their horses, and again assumed the rôle of mounted combatants.