Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

The question of this increase in the Cavalry has, indeed, often before been raised, but never with the weight of concentrated conviction the situation, in my opinion, deserves. For the most part, only expedients to avoid the bitter necessity of a serious augmentation have been suggested. Thus it has been proposed to form new regiments of four squadrons each by taking away from the existing ones their fifth squadron, and the suggestion has been supported by an appeal to the fact that in War-time only four squadrons per regiment take the field.

No expert, however, can fail to agree with Lieutenant-General von Pelet-Narbonne, who maintains in his 'Cavalry Regiments of Four Squadrons' (Kreuz Zeitung, January 17, 1899) that such a measure would entail the ruin of our Cavalry, and would destroy with one blow all that the reorganizations of 1859 and 1860 have done for the War efficiency of our regiments by entailing a depreciation of the value of the squadrons at the very moment when called on to move out and face the enemy.

Thus he writes: 405 squadrons are in Peace retained on the lower establishment of 133, or the middle one of 137. Their numbers are 170 of the former, 235 of the latter, and the War strength averages 150 per squadron. To attain this figure those on the lower establishment need 17 horses, those on the middle 13.

With no fifth squadron to draw upon for horses, as at present, these vacancies would have to be filled by 'augmentation horses'—i.e., animals straight from the country, thoroughly raw and unaccustomed to work under the rider, often also of inferior quality. But these 13 to 17 horses per squadron by no means exhaust the situation. The field squadrons must leave their youngest remounts—say 15 in number—still too young and unbroken, behind them; for the experiences of the last War proved abundantly that where this precaution was neglected the greater part of them broke down under the hardships of the Campaign. Taking even the most favourable time of year for mobilization—viz., in May—then out of the 15 young remounts of good material, and with careful choice, not more than 8 will be found fit for the ranks; the remainder will have to be left behind with the 'Depot' squadron, to be sent on afterwards. Any other procedure would only lead to the useless sacrifice of these valuable young animals. The places of the horses thus left behind will, therefore, also have to be filled by augmentation horses, thus bringing the number of these up to 24 and 20 respectively.

Then we still have to provide for the wants of the Depot squadron, which has to train the recruits, and for these a further number of trained horses, averaging 32, must be left behind, or another 8 from each squadron; and, finally, another 2 per squadron will be required for Staff orderlies and Staff guard duties.

According to this calculation, the Field squadron would have to move out with from 34 to 30 augmentation horses (the sixty squadrons on the higher establishment with 27).

The matter, however, presents a totally different appearance when in peace five squadrons are in existence, of which one remains behind as a depot. Taking away the 35 horses for recruits, and following our previous calculation of 7 young remounts, there would remain on the lower establishment 91 efficient horses to be divided amongst the other four squadrons, or 23 each, so that these would take the field with only 11, 7, or 4 'augmentation horses,' according to the respective peace establishments of the regiments. With these numbers the squadron suffers no reduction of its efficiency, for these few can always be employed—in the squadron carts, etc.—at any rate, need not be in the ranks.

These figures, worked out in the spring of 1899, are still substantially correct, and it appears to me General von Pelet-Narbonne deals too leniently with this proposal for forming the fifth squadrons into new regiments, because many of the calls made on the squadrons are even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always in every squadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will presently have to be cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to take eight remounts into the field, for these young animals are by no means equal to the demands which modern conditions must make upon them from the very first days of mobilization.

Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increased above General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correct in his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals will exercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions than formerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often had a considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituent elements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to the front by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities the fullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, and others not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannot possibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a day straight across country. After a very short spell most of the augmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would only have brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of their squadrons.

These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if the squadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment and somewhat above it—say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this would mean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, our Peace conditions would be difficult to adapt to such an organization. Without going closer into these details, it will be sufficient to point out that all our barracks and riding-schools are designed for five squadrons; and further, that we do not need numerically stronger regiments, but a greater number, in order to satisfy all requirements.