Cavalry in Future Wars

by Friedrich von Bernhardi

Under all circumstances we shall have to endeavour to attain at least that measure of success which the Army Headquarters unconditionally require to render possible their own effective operations.

Superior energy and skill in the conduct of our operations, concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance both of the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in our undertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of our objectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness, and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directly conducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at the psychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces in hand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superiority such concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the end of the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with this purpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, and material strength of the troops, the more we are justified in demanding that, at least as regards organization and training, they shall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them. If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing the highest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even on the most necessary results in time of War.

The question, then, arises whether from these points of view our German Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on to endure.

As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that those commands which form the basis of our War organization—i.e., the Cavalry Divisions—should exist already in Peace as concrete units; and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know each other mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to be realized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions were definitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they would more frequently be brought together for manœuvres on a large scale, to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned.

It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question of organization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Division in Peace than people generally imagine.

The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannot accept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. However desirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is one which has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. The practicable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles in accordance with which the commands are handled should be so thoroughly flesh and blood of both leaders and led, that under all circumstances a sufficient result is secure. To reach this ideal is the true purpose of our training.

In the permanent existence of Divisions it seems to me there is great danger that such a guarantee for their successful employment would be sacrificed.

We have seen that the demands likely to be made on the Cavalry require widely different arrangement of the disposable forces; that this requirement increases in importance as the Arm falls numerically beneath the needs of the situation, and that only a most adaptable organization can deal adequately with the emergencies this numerical insufficiency may entail. Hence it is to be feared that a permanent constitution in Divisions might lose this requisite adaptability, and, however highly we may appreciate the advantages of a firmly welded War organization, one should never allow the form to interfere with the practical application of the means—i.e., never allow the troops to become so rigid as to hamper their employment in the field. But this is just what would happen if the Divisions were maintained on a permanent War footing.

Every application of Cavalry Masses requires a certain measure of drill control, because it depends always on the movement of closed bodies of troops, and if the Cavalry Divisions are constantly drilled together under the same Leader in Peace, there is at least a very great risk that this certain degree of drill control, which we recognise as indispensable, will degenerate into hard-and-fast prescription, since the Leader has always the same number of units at his disposal, and will thus by degrees habituate himself to consider these as invariable quantities in the solution of every tactical problem.

Our experiences with the Regulations for 1876 show that this danger is by no means imaginary, for by the constant practice of the so-called 'Three-Line Tactics' we had already progressed far on the downward path which leads to tactical destruction. If the 'Form' would not fit the conditions, so much the worse for the conditions. Fortunately, thanks to subsequent changes, we have shed the worst of these tendencies, and are on the high-road towards freer and more adaptable tactical formations, but to me it seems that any attempt to fetter this progress by the adoption of a more or less rigid organization can only result in evil for the whole Arm. Rather should we lay down as a fixed principle that all Cavalry units must be able both to move and fight according to the same tactical principles, no matter in what order these units may be grouped together.