Through the Sikh War: A Tale of the Conquest of the Punjaub

by G. A. Henty

As the division of Sir Harry Smith had only reached the camp two days before the battle, Percy remained attached to his staff and rode behind him in the engagement. He had wished his two men to remain in camp, but they resolutely declined to do so.

"If you were killed, sahib, how could we face the colonel, and tell him that while you were killed we were cooking our dinners four miles away? No, sahib, whatever comes, we must ride behind the general's escort. Had we not seen Ferozeshah, we should say that success to-morrow is impossible, for the intrenchments there were but dirt-heaps in comparison to the great works opposite. We can see with our own eyes how big and high they are. They say there are three lines of parapets for the infantry to fire over, besides all their guns. But now we know that nothing is impossible to the white troops, and believe that somehow, though we cannot say how, they will capture it, and drive the Sikhs across the river. If we live through it, it will be a thing to talk of for the rest of our lives; and if we die, you will tell the colonel, sahib, that we did our duty. He told us to watch over you, and though no watching can turn the course of shot or bullet, we can at least be near to carry you off should you fall wounded."

However, Percy escaped without being hit, as did most of the staff, though he did his share in carrying orders to the officers commanding the different regiments in the division. As they rode back from the field after the engagement was over the general called him up to his side.

"I ought to have kept you out of the battle, lad," he said kindly; "but I did not like to baulk you again. You have done very well, and I shall mention your name in my report as among the members of my staff who did good service."

The battle of Sobraon completely broke the power of the Sikhs. In these and the preceding fights all the picked regiments of the regular infantry had been destroyed or dispersed, and two hundred and twenty of their guns captured. No time was lost by the commander-in-chief in following up his success. A bridge of boats had been already thrown across the river half-way between Ferozepore and Sobraon, and messages were sent to Sir John Grey, who commanded a force there, and to Sir John Littler at Ferozepore, to cross at once. At daybreak next morning six regiments crossed the Sutlej from Ferozepore, while Sir John Grey, with two regiments of cavalry, three of infantry, and a battery, crossed by the new bridge, both forces thus placing themselves on the road by which the defeated Sikhs would retire upon Lahore. This speedy movement completed their discomfiture. Cut off from the capital, and deprived of the leadership of all the principal sirdars, they dispersed to their homes, and the bridge at Sobraon having been repaired on the day following the battle, the British crossed without opposition.

Ghoolab Singh, who had all this time been negotiating secretly with the British, while promising the Sikhs that he was on the eve of advancing to join them with his whole force, now endeavoured to figure as mediator, and came secretly into the British camp with the object of persuading the governor-general to abstain from making an advance against Lahore. Sir Henry Hardinge refused to receive him, and sent a message to him by his political officers that terms of peace would be dictated at the capital. The crafty sirdar was not to be defeated; riding back to Lahore, he took the young maharajah and rode with him to the British camp. Sir Henry received the young prince kindly, but was not to be diverted from his purpose of moving forward to Lahore, where the army arrived without a shot being fired.

Here terms of peace were dictated to the humbled Sikhs. The expenses of the war, estimated at a million and a half, were to be paid, all the guns taken were to be retained, and all others that had been used against us during the war were to be handed over; the troops were to be disbanded, and the fertile province known as the Jalindar Doab, situated between the Beas and Sutlej rivers, was to be handed over to the British. Many of the officers considered that it would have been better to have annexed the whole of the Punjaub, but even with the army that was marching from Scinde under Sir Charles Napier the force was insufficient for the work. The Sikhs had strongly fortified cities, that could scarcely have been taken without a regular battering train, and the hot season was coming on. Besides, although the army trained with so much care by Runjeet Singh had been broken up and scattered, the Sikh nation had as yet taken but little part in the struggle. It was, however, certain that they would, under their great chiefs, fight desperately to preserve their independence, and the whole of the dispersed soldiery would speedily be reunited under the banners of the leaders.

The crafty Ghoolab Singh gained the advantages he had hoped, for the treasury of Lahore was empty, and with the greatest difficulty half a million was raised to pay the first instalment of the indemnity. Ghoolab Singh, therefore, out of his vast resources paid another half million, on condition that Cashmere should be handed over to him, and that from being merely the governor of that province, he should become its independent ruler. The price paid by him for this rich province was absurdly inadequate, but so far as the British were concerned the bargain was a politic one. There was little doubt that a second war would, sooner or later, have to be undertaken; Ghoolab Singh could put a very large army into the field, and by making him ruler of Cashmere his interests were at once separated from those of the Sikhs, and his neutrality, if not his active alliance, were secured in any future struggle. It was arranged that a British force should remain in Lahore for a year, nominally to insure the payment of the rest of the indemnity, but really to maintain the authority of the maharanee and the boy maharajah, who were in no way responsible for the war against us, and who doubtless would have been overthrown by some ambitious sirdar, aided by the disbanded troops, had they been left unsupported by British bayonets.

CHAPTER XI.

AN AMBUSH.