To Herat and Cabul: A Story of the First Afghan War

by G. A. Henty

The shops of Cabul excited the admiration of the officers and men of the British force. Probably nowhere else in the world could such a display of fruit have been collected. Here were piles of peaches equal to the finest product of English hothouses, grapes of five varieties, rosy apples, juicy pears, several delicious kinds of melons, almonds, pistachio nuts, walnuts, quinces, cherries, and red and white mulberries, and vegetables of all kinds. The butchers' shops were cleanly and well arranged; there were public ovens, in which loaves, and the cakes of which the Afghans are extremely fond, were baking when the force entered. In the potters' shops were jars and drinking vessels of all kinds; Afghan, Persian, and Russian cloths, cloaks, furs of many kinds, sets of china and Dresden porcelain in the shops of the wealthier traders; and behind these open shops were inner apartments with very fine and costly shawls, silks, precious stones, valuable carpets, and tea imported by way of Bokhara. Conspicuous were the shops of manufacturers of swords and daggers, and makers of scabbards and belts, shields and chain armour, and even of bookbinders, who manufactured covers for manuscript copies of Persian poems and stories. Unfortunately for the moral of the army, there were also manufactories of spirits. Since leaving Candahar no spirit rations had been served out, and the troops had greatly benefited in health during their arduous work by the privation, but the power to purchase vile spirits at a very low price now tempted many into drinking to intoxication, and lowered at once their health and discipline.

Mr. Macnaghten and his staff had a fine building in the Bala Hissar allotted to them. Sir Alexander Burnes with his assistants occupied a house in the city. The position of Burnes was an unsatisfactory one. He had a right to expect that after his previous residence in Cabul he would be appointed British resident there, and he had only accepted a secondary position upon the understanding that Macnaghten's appointment was a temporary one. He had on the way up rendered much valuable assistance, but he had no strictly defined duties. His opinion was seldom asked, and if given, was wholly disregarded. For this he was himself somewhat to blame. His temperament was a changeable one. At times he was full of enthusiasm and saw everything in the rosiest light; at other times he was depressed and despondent, and came to be regarded as a prophet of evil. Having no serious work to occupy his mind, he worried over trifles, exaggerated the importance of the bazaar rumours, and was often filled with the gloomiest anticipations.

The war had been undertaken altogether in opposition to his advice. He had been most favourably impressed with Dost Mahomed, and his remonstrances against the attempt to force Shah Soojah on the Afghans had been so strong and persistent, that the home government, in defending themselves from the public indignation excited by subsequent disaster, even went the length of suppressing some of his despatches and garbling others, after he was no longer alive to proclaim the falsification.

Once at Cabul, his opportunities for doing useful service came to an end. Macnaghten, who was always sanguine to an extent that, in the light of subsequent events, seemed to border on insanity, was all-powerful with the new Ameer. The expression of any opinion which ran counter to his own was in the highest degree distasteful to him, and it was only in negotiations for the supply of the troops, and with the petty chiefs, that Burnes and his staff found any employment.

Although Pushtoo was the language of the country-people who came in with goods, the inhabitants of Cabul almost universally spoke Persian, and Angus Campbell and Azim found themselves quite at home among them.

On the 3rd of September, a force under Colonel Wade, which had advanced through the Khyber Pass, arrived at Cabul. It was a mixed body composed principally of Pathans and Sikhs. It had met with comparatively small resistance, but had rendered valuable service, as a large force had been detached from Dost Mahomed's army to oppose its advance, and thus greatly weakened the army with which the Ameer had intended to meet the British advance from Candahar. The Afghan force had been recalled in haste after the news of the fall of Ghuznee, but had not arrived until after the disbandment of the Ameer's army and his flight to the Bamian Pass, when it had also broken up, and Wade was therefore able to reach Cabul without opposition.

It was now necessary to decide what should be done with the army of occupation. Macnaghten was pressing by a constant succession of letters that large reinforcements should be sent up in order to win back for Shah Soojah the territories that had once formed part of the Afghan empire. He urged that in order to check Russian aggression an army should not only occupy Herat, but should extend its operations until it became paramount at Bokhara; while, on the other hand, Peshawur and the territory wrested from Afghanistan by the Sikhs should be reconquered, and the Sikh nation, which was becoming more and more hostile to us, should be brought into subjection. But fortunately Lord Auckland, now freed from the pernicious influence of Macnaghten and surrounded by discreet counsellors, was by no means disposed to turn a favourable ear to these fantastic projects. The cost of the army of occupation was a heavy drain on the revenue of India, and so far from any assistance being rendered by Afghanistan, Shah Soojah was constantly clamouring for subsidies to enable him to maintain his position. The absence of so many troops was also much felt in India, for they were greatly needed on the frontiers of the Beloochees as well as those of the Sikhs. Macnaghten had so persistently asserted that Shah Soojah was personally popular with the Afghans, that it was decided that only a comparatively small force was needed to uphold his authority in case Dost Mahomed should make an effort to recover his throne, and orders were given that the greater portion of the Bombay army should march down through the Kojuk and Bolan Passes, and most of the Bengal troops through the Khyber, leaving some six regiments, with a proportion of artillery, at Cabul, with garrisons at Ghuznee, Candahar, Quettah, and Jellalabad.

Macnaghten in vain remonstrated and entreated. It was settled that the movement should begin at the end of September, so that the troops could regain the plains before winter set in in earnest. September passed quietly. The climate at this time was perfect, and the troops enjoyed the rest, with the abundance of fruit and vegetables. There were reviews and races. Shah Soojah established an order of knighthood, and held a grand durbar, at which the principal officers were invested, with great ceremony, with the insignia of the new order. On the 18th of the month the Bombay column started on its march, but news having been brought down from the force that had occupied the Bamian Pass, that Dost Mahomed was collecting a formidable army, the authorities were induced to maintain a great portion of the Bengal force round Cabul. Great difficulties arose with reference to provisioning these troops through the winter. There was abundant accommodation for them in the Bala Hissar and its citadel, but Shah Soojah strongly objected to the presence of a large body of troops there. Macnaghten, with his usual weakness, gave way.

On the 15th of October Sir John Keane, with that portion of the Bengal force that was to return, set out. The Ameer left two days later, to spend the winter in the more genial climate of Jellalabad, and Macnaghten accompanied him. Sanguine as he was, he could not help feeling uneasy at the situation. The British occupation had greatly benefited the merchants and traders, the farmers and cultivators of Cabul, but it had seriously injured the poorer portion of the community. The natural result of so large an army, well supplied with money, being stationed in the city, was to raise the price of all articles of consumption prodigiously, and to cause wide-spread discontent. The exactions of the native tax-collectors pressed heavily upon all the tribesmen. The British officers, by the terms of the treaty with Shah Soojah, were unable to interfere in any way with the internal affairs of the country; but when the natives revolted against the unjust exactions it was they who were called upon to suppress them, consequently the infidel supporters of the Ameer became more and more hated by the people, and it was soon dangerous for them to go beyond the limits of their camps. The Ameer himself resented the state of subjection in which he considered that he was held, though he could not dispense with British bayonets and British money. Macnaghten left behind him experienced administrators. Burnes, Conolly, Leech, Todd, and Lord had all long acquaintance with the country, and if anyone could, under such circumstances, have reconciled the country to foreign occupation, they would have done so.