The great Persian War and its preliminaries

by G. B. Grundy

GREEKS RETURN TO ARTEMESIUM.

H. vii. 191, ad fin.

The storm had not ceased until that very morning. It is quite certain that the battered Persian fleet must have required some hours of preparation before it could put out from the Sepiad strand; and it did not reach Aphetæ until the early afternoon. The fifteen vessels must have come up some hours later, well on in the afternoon, since the main fleet had evidently disappeared into the Pagasætic Gulf before they entered the channel; otherwise they could not have made the mistake they did make. The story of their capture shows that on the afternoon of that day the Greek fleet was already back at Artemisium. Had it come up from Chalkis that morning? It is not impossible that it should have done so; but it is improbable.[133]

H. vii. 196.

“So the Persian fleet, with the exception of the fifteen vessels which, as I have said, Sandokes commanded, came to Aphetæ.”

The composite character of the sources of the historian’s narrative is well illustrated by the next episode in the strange story. It is of the nature of a by-plot in the drama inserted with a view to illustrate not merely the services of the Athenians in saving the situation, but also the twofold character of the man who now becomes for the first time prominent in the story. H. viii 4. In brief the tale is that the fleet, after returning to Artemisium, discovered that the disaster at the Sepiad strand had by no means been so great as had been imagined. So alarmed were the Greeks at this, that “they discussed whether they should retreat from Artemisium to Middle Greece.” The Eubœans, who thus saw themselves likely to be suddenly deserted without the possibility of providing for the safety of their children and households, implored Eurybiades to allow them time to remove them to a place of security. Finding they could make no impression upon him, they resorted to Themistocles, to whom they offered a bribe of thirty talents, if he would take measures to keep the fleet where it was. Themistocles undertook to do so, and proceeded to bribe Eurybiades with a gift of five talents, and Adeimantos, the Corinthian admiral, with three talents.

The tale excites the strongest suspicion of having been an invention of after-time, concocted by political opponents of Themistocles. Herodotus’ whole attitude to Themistocles is suspicious. He is quite unable to suppress the greatness of the services which he rendered to the Greek cause; but he is ever ready to discount the value of those services either by tales discreditable to the personal character of the man who rendered them, H. vii. 144. or by attributing to him motives other than those which really prompted his action.

Nor do the details of the story, when taken into consideration, tend to make it appear more probable. No doubt the Peloponnesian members of the fleet seized every possible occasion for urging such a withdrawal. It must have been known to them that the force sent to Thermopylæ did not represent any real effort on their part. It could hardly be expected that they should display any large amount of zeal in carrying out a policy of which they wholly disapproved, and in the execution of which their own authorities were so manifestly half-hearted. They knew that, if they left Artemisium, the army must leave Thermopylæ; and they were no doubt convinced that that was the very best thing which could possibly happen. But on the practical question of withdrawal, other considerations must have influenced those in command. Unless the retreat from Thermopylæ were begun many hours before the withdrawal of the fleet, the army must be caught in a trap. With a light-armed enemy in vastly superior numbers in hot pursuit, the retreat could not have been rapid, and the Persian fleet would have had ample time to land troops in such a position as would make it possible to cut the line of it.

REPORTED BRIBERY OF THEMISTOCLES.

There is no trace whatever in the Thermopylæ story of a message having been received from the fleet advising the garrison of its intended withdrawal. That may be attributed to the incompleteness of the story itself. This explanation, however, can hardly be considered satisfactory in view of the fact that, had anything of the kind occurred, such an incident would hardly have been omitted from a version the main object of which was to depict the disaster as an act of deliberate self-sacrifice on the part of Leonidas.