Imperial Headquarters,
February 5, 1916 (o.s.).
“Most honoured Serguey Dmitrievich,—At the request of General Alexiev, I waited on him to discuss how the capture of Erzerum could be best exploited.
“Such an event obviously points to a certain state of mind in Turkey which we should turn to account. If a separate peace with Turkey was to be contemplated, it should be borne in mind that such favourable circumstances are not likely to occur again within a long time. It would undoubtedly be our advantage to start the negotiations after a victory which the enemy rightly or wrongly fears will be attended with a new catastrophe.
“Considering that our forces on the secondary front of Caucasus are insignificant and it is impossible to take away one soldier from the chief centre of operations, it would be most difficult, in General Alexiev’s opinion, to derive full profit from the glorious success of our Caucasian army in a strictly military sense.
“Though he does not wish to advocate an immediate peace with Turkey, the general desires me to bring to your knowledge some of his views concerning this eventuality that the situation created by our recent success may be carefully considered and fully utilised.
“According to him, it would be most important to specify the war aims of Russia. Though the brigadier-general is fully aware this is a question to be settled by the Government, yet he thinks his opinion might be of some weight.
“In the course of our conversation, we have come to the following conclusions:
“Whatever may have been our prospects at the time when Turkey entered into the war, of securing compensations at the cost of the latter country when peace is concluded, we must own that our expectations will not be fulfilled during the present war. The longer the war lasts, the more difficult it will be for us to secure the possession of the Straits. General Alexiev and General Danilov agree on this point. I refer you to my letters of December, 1914, and January, 1915, as to Danilov’s opinion.
“The defeat of the chief enemy and the restoration of the parts of the Empire we have lost should be our chief war aim. Our most important enemy is Germany, for there cannot be any question that at the present time it is more important for us to recover the Baltic Provinces than take possession of the Straits. We must by all means defeat Germany. It is a difficult task, which will require great efforts and sacrifices. The temporary abandonment of some of our hopes should be one of these sacrifices.