The Turks and Europe

by Gaston Gaillard

“Considering the advantages a separate peace with Turkey would bring us, we might offer it to her without injuring our real ‘interests’—the occupation of the Straits being merely postponed—on the basis of the status quo ante bellum, including the restoration of the Capitulations and the other rights acquired by the treaties. We should also demand the dismissal of the Germans, with a promise on our side to defend Turkey in case of German reprisals. If a separate peace could be concluded with Turkey on such a basis, all our Caucasian army would be available. We could send it to Bessarabia and thus—who knows?—bring Rumania to our side, or, if Turkey asks for it, send it to defend Constantinople. England would heave a sigh of relief when the dangers of the Egyptian campaign and of the Muslim movement thus vanished. She would then be able to send her Egyptian army—nine divisions—to Salonika and Kavala, bar the way definitely to the Bulgarians and liberate Serbia with the help of the French, the Italians, and the reconstituted Serbian Army. If Turkey were no longer our enemy, the situation in the Balkans would be quite altered, and we should be able to keep in touch with our Allies by clearing the southern route of Europe. In short, the advantages of a separate peace with Turkey are innumerable. The chief result would be the defeat of Germany, the only common war aim of all the Allies. No doubt, we all—they as well as we—will have to waive some of our cherished schemes. But we are not bound to give them up for ever. If we carry on the war with Turkey, we delude ourselves with the hope our ideal can be fulfilled. If we interrupt the war with that country, we postpone for a time the fulfilment of our wishes. But in return for this, we shall defeat Germany, the only thing which can secure a lasting peace for all the Allies and a political, military, and moral superiority for Russia. If a victory over Germany gives us back the paramount situation we enjoyed after the Napoleonic wars, why could not the glorious period of the treaties of Adrianople and Hunkiar-i-Skelessi occur again? In concluding that treaty we should have only to take care not to offend the Western Powers, and yet meet the requirements of Russia.

“Perhaps I have stated General Alexiev’s opinions too unreservedly, as I wished to give this report a definite form. Though the brigadier-general does not wish to be the advocate or promoter of the idea of a separate peace with Turkey, I am sure he looks upon this as a highly profitable scheme.

“Of course, many difficulties will have to be overcome in the conclusion of such a peace; but is not every matter of importance attended with difficulties? Public opinion should be warned that we cannot possibly secure the fulfilment of all our wishes at once, that it is impossible for us to shake off German hegemony, reconquer the shores of the Baltic, and the other provinces now in the hands of the enemy, and at the same time take Constantinople. The conquest of Tsarigrad in the present circumstances must necessarily raise many a political and moral question. The Turks, too, will have to be convinced. But they may be influenced both by logical and pecuniary arguments. If once the question of the loss of their capital is waived, it will be pretty easy for us to convince them that the Germans merely want their help for selfish purposes without any risk to themselves. If some of them turned a deaf ear to logical arguments, we might resort to more substantial arguments, as has always been the way with Turkey.

“But the discussion of such details is still premature. For the present, the important points are:

“1. Plainly to define our real war aim.

“2. To decide, in connection with this aim, whether a separate peace with Turkey should not be contemplated at once.

“3. To prepare public opinion—the Duma is to meet tomorrow—and our Allies for such a turn of events.

“I want to conclude this long letter by stating that General Alexiev and I share the feelings of all Russians in regard to Constantinople, that we do not disregard the ‘historical call of Russia,’ in the solution of the Eastern question, but that we are actuated by the sincere wish to clarify the situation by distinguishing what is possible at the present time from those aspirations whose fulfilment is momentarily—only momentarily—impossible.”

It is obvious that if, at the beginning of the war, General Kuropatkine maintained that it was a military necessity to occupy part of Turkey, it was because the only aim of Russia in entering into the conflict was the conquest of Constantinople.

In an article entitled “La Neutralisation des Dardanelles et du Bosphore,” which was written at the beginning of the war, M. Miliukov confirmed the Russian designs on the Black Sea and consequently on all the part of Europe and Asia Minor contiguous to it. He recalled that, by the former treaties concluded with Russia before the European nations had interfered in the Eastern question—those of 1798, 1805, and 1833—the Porte had granted Russian warships the free passage of the Straits, though the Black Sea was still closed to the warships of any other Power, and that when the treaties of 1841, 1856, and 1871 had laid down the principle of the closure of the Straits, Russia had always preferred this state of things to the opening of the Black Sea to the warships of all nations. This article throws a light on the policy pursued by Russia and the propaganda she is still carrying on in the hope of bringing about the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. So the writer recognised that it was the duty of Russia to oppose the dispossession of Turkey and that, if the Straits passed under Russian sovereignty, they ought not to be neutralised.