CONTENTS OF VOL. I
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE [v]
INTRODUCTION [1]
I. The Limits of Aesthetic defined, and certain Objections against the Philosophy of Art refuted [1]
[(a) Aesthetic confined to Beauty of Art [2]
(b) Is Art unworthy of scientific consideration? [4]
(c) Or at least is it incapable of truly philosophical exposition? Negative answer to both these questions] [6]
II. Scientific Methods which apply to the Beautiful and Art [17]
[1. The Empirical Method [18]
2. Abstract Reflection [27]
3. The Philosophical Idea of artistic Beauty, that is, the notional concept thereof, provisionally defined] [28]
III. The Notion of the Beauty of Art [29]
Observations upon the ordinary ideas about Art
1. The art-work is a creation of human activity [33]
[(a) Theory of imitation of Art by rule [33]
(b) Art as direct inspiration [36]
(c) The rank of Art relatively to Nature [38]
(d) The nature of the human Art-impulse] [40]
2. The art-work is addressed to human sense [43]
[(a) Theory that its object is to excite feeling [43]
(b) The nature of artistic taste [45]
(c) The nature of art-scholarship as contrasted with artistic taste 46
(d) The more philosophical consequences of the fact that Art appeals to sense and requires a sensuous medium for its expression] [47]
3. The End or Interest of Art [57]
[(a) Is it imitation of Nature? [57]
(b) Is the end or content identical with the dictum, "Humani nihil a me alienum," etc. [63]
(c) How far it is a mitigation or purification of the passions [65]
(d) The higher object of Art which consists in its revelation of truth in itself] [76]
IV. Historical Deduction of the true Notion of Art [77]
1. The philosophy of Kant [78]
[(a) Feeling of aesthetic satisfaction not appetitive [80]
(b) Beauty an object of universal satisfaction [80]
(c) Teleological aspect of the Beautiful [81]
(d) Pleasure in the Beautiful necessary, though felt [82]
2. Schiller, Winckelmann, and Schelling [84]
3. Irony] [90]
V. Division of the Subject [95]
[1. Inquiry as to the mode under which the divisions of the subject arise from the notional concept of Beauty [95]
2. Part I. The Ideal [99]
3. Part II. The particular general types of Beauty [100]
(a) The Symbolic type of Art [103]
(b) The Classical type of Art [104]
(c) The Romantic type of Art [106]
4. Part III. The specific arts [110]
(a) Architecture [112]
(b) Sculpture [113]
(c) Romantic art, which includes
(α) Painting [117]
(β) Music [118]
(γ) Poetry [119]
5. Conclusion] [122]
FIRST PART
THE IDEA OF THE BEAUTY OF ART OR THE IDEAL
I. The Position of Art relatively to finite Reality, Religion, and Philosophy [125]
[(a) Theory that the Beautiful is no intelligible object of thought [125]
(b) The relation of the human reason to Nature both empirically and speculatively [126]
(c) The realm of Fine Art that of the Absolute Spirit [129]
(d) How far Art responds to a genuine spiritual want in man [130]
(e) The truth which forms the content of art, religion, and philosophy differs only in the modes under which it is presented] [139]
CHAPTER I
THE NOTION OF THE BEAUTIFUL IN GENERAL
1. The Idea [147]
[(a) The Idea is concrete, not abstract [149]
(b) Objectivity is the real existence of the notion, and the means whereby it is actualized [152]
(c) The Idea is the harmonized totality of the two aspects] [152]
2. The Determinate Existence of the Idea [153]
3. The Idea of the Beautiful [153]
[(a) Not apprehended alone by the faculty of the understanding, or the finite categories [154]
(b) The nature of finite or abstract apprehension and practical volition considered [155]
(c) The object of beauty resolves and the one-sidedness of both standpoints in a free and infinite totality] [157]
CHAPTER II
THE BEAUTY OF NATURE
A. The Beauty of Nature as such [160]
1. The Idea as Life [160]
[(a) The first mode under which the notion is in Nature asserted as objectivity is that of physical matter, the ideal unity whereof is not found as ideality [160]
(b) A further step is the integration of natural objects under a unified system, as the solar system [161]
(c) The third mode is that of organic Life. This alone is a determinate existence of the Idea] [163]
2. The animated life of Nature as Beauty [171]
[(a) The motion of life considered in relation to the conception of beauty [171]
(b) The nature of organic unity, and the degree it contributes to the beauty of an object [173]
(c) The inward unity of soul-life and the degree it contributes to the correlation of parts of an organism, or is asserted in external form to our senses rather than our reflection] [175]
3. Modes under which the beauty of Nature is investigated [179]
[(a) Where the form is immediately in the materia as its essence or conformative energy, as in crystals, or more concretely as the informing soul through the living organism [180]
(b) Mobility in animals as a test of their apparent beauty [180]
(c) Self-conscious life the culminating mode] [182]
B. The external Beauty of abstract Form viewed as Uniformity, Symmetry, Conformity to Rule, and Harmony. Also Beauty regarded generally as abstract unity of the Sensuous Material [184]
C. The Defective Aspects of the Beauty of Nature [196]
1. The Inward principle in its immediacy as merely such inwardness [199]
[(a) Immediate singularity as conserved in the purely animal organism [199]
(b) Of the nature of the contrast between the above and the human body [200]
(c) Social organizations viewed in such particularized immediacy, and the defects they betray as such external totalities] [201]
2. The Dependence of particular existence as viewed in its immediate singularity [202]
[(a) The dependence of animal life upon its natural environment [203]
(b) The nature of a similar dependence in the case of the human organism [203]
(c) The dependence of human souls, or spiritual interests, on the prose-life of ordinary existence] [204]
3. The limitations implied by such conditions [205]
[(a) The restriction of species in the animal world, and of the social condition as it affects human individuality [205]
(b) The limitation of racial division, or of particular families, or particular professions, and the effect of such upon the aspect of beauty [206]
(c) It is the very defects of this finite plane of reality, which stimulates man to recover the vision of his freedom in Art] [208]
CHAPTER III
THE BEAUTY OF ART OR THE IDEAL
A. The Ideal as such [209]
1. Individuality which partakes of Beauty [209]
[(a) The nature of the conditions under which Art can express a profound and infinite spiritual content [210]
(b) What Art rejects from natural embodiment in order to effect this revelation, which is also a purification [212]
(c) This "referring back" of external form to spirituality, or inwardness, issuing in harmonious individuality, is the very nature of the Ideal [213]
(α) The blythe serenity of antique art [214]
(β) The treatment of emotion by romantic art [215]
(γ) Irony] [217]
2. The Ideal relatively to Nature [218]
[(a) The formal ideality of a work of art, i.e., the element of poetry therein [220]
(b) The creative faculty contrasted with Nature in its power to grasp ideal significance, with illustrations of this power [222]
(c) The nature of this spiritual recreation of natural fact by Art originating in the energy of mind. Illustration with the example of Dutch art in its genre painting, also with that of portraiture and classical art] [227]
B. The Determinate Character of the Ideal [236]
I. Ideal determinacy as such [237]
1. Thought apart from the plastic material can only comprehend the Divine in its universality and unity. Mohammedan and Hebrew art [237]
2. The polytheistic aspect of Hellenic art considered, as also Christian art [237]
3. The relation of the arts of painting and sculpture to the latter. The transition from the principle of spiritual repose to that of development and conflict [238]
II. The Action [240]
1. The universal World-condition [241]
[(a)
(α) The self-subsistency of such a condition as a necessary prius of the embodiment of the Ideal [242]
(β) The nature of the reality adapted to artistic treatment as contrasted with what is not so adapted. The fixed order of the State as contrasted with conditions most favourable to free individuality [245]
(γ) Further examination of contrast in relation to judicial functions and the ideas of punishment or revenge as we find it in the heroic age. The reappearance of an analogous condition in the Middle Ages [248]
(b) Modern prosaic life the condition most favourable to the private or personal life as an object of interest [258]
(c) Resistance by individual poets to this process of social change. The permanent demand for the heroic] [260]
2. The Situation [263]
[(a) The situation that is devoid of situation [267]
(b) The situation as defined in its harmlessness or absence of further conflict [268]
(α) The movement from pure tranquillity to movement or expression. Illustrations from classical art [269]
(β) Movement as related to externality. The initial stage of action. Greek sculpture [269]
(γ) Situation in movement presented as an opportunity to further expression. Illustrations from poetry] [271]
(c) The Collision [272]
[(α) Collisions which arise from wholly material conditions. Only of artistic interest as a consequence of natural misfortune. Illustrations [274]
(β) Spiritual collisions dependent on natural conditions. Classified and illustrated. [276]
(γ) The above only form the starting-point of the collision of the essential forces of spiritual life. The third and most important type is the collision caused by the disruption of Spirit alone. Illustrations] [283]
3. The Action [289]
(a) The universal forces operative in the action.
[(α) These forces are the eternally paramount religious and ethical modes of relationship, such as family, fatherland, church, friendship, status, honour, and love. They are children of the one absolute Idea. Illustration of their contention [292]
(β) They must not act in discord with the main action. The position of evil powers as confronting them, and its treatment by classic and modern poetry [293]
(γ) Such forces must appear in Art as embodied in particular personalities. Contrast between ancient and modern art in this respect] [296]
(b) The individuals concerned in the action [299]
[(α) The relations between gods and men in classical art, and that between the Divine and the human in Christian art [300]
[β] Pathos considered in its relation to various modes of art] [302]
(c) Character [313]
[(α) Viewed as co-extensive or self-coherent individuality, relatively, that is, to the intrinsic wealth it connotes. Illustrations [315]
(β) Viewed relatively to the particular form under which it is bound to appear [317]
(γ) Viewed as a concrete unity coalescing wholly with its determinate form and as assured character. Illustrations classified in their stability and lack of such] [320]
III. The External Determination of the Ideal. [325]
1. The abstract Externality as such. [329]
[(a) Spatiality, Uniformity, Figure, Time, and Colour. [330]
(α) How far such contribute to artistic production [336]
(β) The necessity of clear articulation of form and tone considered] [337]
2. The Coalescence of the concrete Ideal with its external Reality [339]
[(α) The bond of unity regarded as no positive reality, but as a mysterious or secret connection. The relation of external Nature to the work of art. The Homeric poems contrasted with the "Niebelungenlied" in this respect [340]
(b) Where the unity is expressly due to human activity and human adaptation of means to ends [340]
[(α) The use made by man of ornament or of anything used for mere show, e.g., precious metals for statuary [340]
(β) The question how far objects used for practical purposes are suited for art. The idyllic, civilized and heroic condition compared in the degree they are thus adapted[341]
(γ) The spiritual environment itself in social institutions, etc., regarded in its relation to ideal character] [355]
3. The Externality of a work of Art in relation to a Public [355]
(a) What is implied in the assertion by the artist of the particular culture of his own times? [358]
(b) What may be regarded as truth when the reference is to a Past, either in an exclusive or objective sense? [363]
(c) What may still be regarded as valid in truth though the matter be appropriated from a time and nationality foreign to the artist? All three questions discussed and illustrated] [365]
C. The Artist [379]
1. Imagination, Genius, and Inspiration [380]
2. The objective character of the artistic presentation [392]
3. Manner, Style, and Originality. 394
THE PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART
INTRODUCTION
I
The present inquiry[1] has for its subject-matter Aesthetic. It is a subject co-extensive with the entire realm of the beautiful; more specifically described, its province is that of Art, or rather, we should say, of Fine Art.
For a subject-matter such as this the term "Aesthetic" is no doubt not entirely appropriate, for "Aesthetic" denotes more accurately the science of the senses or emotion. It came by its origins as a science, or rather as something that to start with purported to be a branch of philosophy, during the period of the school of Wolff, in other words when works of art were generally regarded in Germany with reference to the feelings they were calculated to evoke, as, for example, the feelings of pleasure, admiration, fear, pity, and so forth. It is owing to the unsuitability or, more strictly speaking, the superficiality of this term that the attempt has been made by some to apply the name "Callistic" to this science. Yet this also is clearly insufficient inasmuch as the science here referred to does not investigate beauty in its general signification, but the beauty of art pure and simple. For this reason we shall accommodate ourselves to the term Aesthetic, all the more so as the mere question of nomenclature is for ourselves a matter of indifference. It has as such been provisionally accepted in ordinary speech, and we cannot do better than retain it. The term, however, which fully expresses our science is "Philosophy of Art," and, with still more precision, "Philosophy of Fine Art."
(a) In virtue of this expression we at once exclude the beauty of Nature from the scientific exposition of Fine Art. Such a limitation of our subject may very well appear from a certain point of view as an arbitrary boundary line, similar to that which every science is entitled to fix in the demarcation of its subject-matter. We must not, however, understand the limitation of "Aesthetic" to the beauty of art in this sense. We are accustomed, no doubt, in ordinary life to speak of a beautiful colour, a beautiful heaven, a beautiful stream, to say nothing of beautiful flowers, animals, and, above all, of beautiful human beings. Without entering now into the disputed question how far the quality of beauty can justly be predicated of such objects, and consequently the beauty of Nature comes generally into competition with that of art, we are justified in maintaining categorically that the beauty of art stands higher than Nature. For the beauty of art is a beauty begotten, a new birth of mind[2]; and to the extent that Spirit and its creations stand higher than Nature and its phenomena, to that extent the beauty of art is more exalted than the beauty of Nature. Indeed, if we regard the matter in its formal aspect, that is to say, according to the way it is there, any chance fancy that passes through any one's head[3], is of higher rank than any product of Nature. For in every case intellectual conception and freedom are inseparable from such a conceit. In respect to content the sun appears to us an absolutely necessary constituent of actual fact, while the perverse fancy passes away as something accidental and evanescent. None the less in its own independent being a natural existence such as the sun possesses no power of self-differentiation; it is neither essentially free nor self-aware; and, if we regard it in its necessary cohesion with other things, we do not regard it independently for its own sake, and consequently not as beautiful.
Merely to maintain, in a general way, that mind and the beauty of art which originates therefrom stand higher than the beauty of Nature is no doubt to establish next to nothing. The expression higher is obviously entirely indefinite; it still indicates the beauty of Nature and art as standing juxtaposed in the field of conception, and emphasizes the difference as a quantitative and accordingly external difference. But in predicating of mind and its artistic beauty a higher place in contrast to Nature, we do not denote a distinction which is merely relative. Mind, and mind alone, is pervious to truth, comprehending all in itself, so that all which is beautiful can only be veritably beautiful as partaking in this higher sphere and as begotten of the same. Regarded under this point of view it is only a reflection of the beauty appertinent to mind, that is, we have it under an imperfect and incomplete mode, and one whose substantive being is already contained in the mind itself.