I now regard the Cheyennes and Arapahoes at war, and that it will be impossible for our troops to discriminate between the well-disposed and the warlike parts of these bands, unless an absolute separation be made. I prefer that the agents collect all of the former and conduct them to their reservation within the Indian territory south of Kansas, there to be provided for under their supervision, say about old Fort Cobb. I cannot consent to their being collected and held near Fort Larned. So long as Agent Wynkoop remains at Fort Larned the vagabond part of the Indians will cluster about him for support, and to beg of the military. The vital part of these tribes are committing murders and robberies from Kansas to Colorado, and it is an excess of generosity on our part to be feeding and supplying the old, young, and feeble, while their young men are at war.
I do not pretend to say what should be done with these, but it will simplify our game of war, already complicated enough, by removing them well away from our field of operations.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
(Signed) W. T. Sherman, Lieutenant-General, commanding.
Again, on the 26th of the same month, General Sherman, in a letter to General Schofield, then Secretary of War, writes: “The annuity goods for these Indians, Kiowas and Comanches, should be sent to Fort Cobb, and the Indian agent for these Indians should go there at once. And if the Secretary of the Interior has any contingent fund out of which he could provide food, or if he could use a part of the regular appropriation for food instead of clothing, it may keep these Indians from joining the hostile Cheyennes and Arapahoes. The latter should receive nothing, and now that they are at war, I propose to give them enough of it to satisfy them to their hearts’ content, and General Sheridan will not relax his efforts till the winter will put them at our mercy. He reports that he can already account for about seventy dead Indians, and his forces are right in among these hostile Indians on the Upper Republican, and on the head of the Canadian south of Fort Dodge.”
Still another letter from General Sherman to the Secretary of War argues the case as follows: “All the Cheyennes and Arapahoes are now at war. Admitting that some of them have not done acts of murder, rape, etc., still they have not restrained those who have, nor have they on demand given up the criminals as they agreed to do. The treaty made at Medicine Lodge is, therefore, already broken by them, and the War Department should ask the concurrence of the Indian Department, or invoke the superior orders of the President against any goods whatever, even clothing, going to any part of the tribes named, until this matter is settled. As military commander I have the right, unless restrained by superior orders, to prevent the issue of any goods whatever to Indians outside of these reservations; and if the agency for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes be established at or near old Fort Cobb, the agent should if possible be able to provide for and feed such as may go there of their own volition, or who may be driven there by our military movements.... I have despatched General Hazen to the frontier, with a limited amount of money wherewith to aid the said agents to provide for the peaceful parts of those tribes this winter, while en route to and after their arrival at their new homes. No better time could be possibly chosen than the present for destroying or humiliating those bands that have so outrageously violated their treaties and begun a devastating war without one particle of provocation; and after a reasonable time given for the innocent to withdraw, I will solicit an order from the President declaring all Indians who remain outside of their lawful reservations to be outlaws, and commanding all people, soldiers and citizens, to proceed against them as such. We have never heretofore been in a condition to adopt this course, because until now we could not clearly point out to these Indians where they may rightfully go to escape the consequences of the hostile acts of their fellows. The right to hunt buffaloes, secured by the treaties, could also be regulated so as to require all parties desiring to hunt to procure from the agent a permit, which permit should be indorsed by the commanding officer of the nearest military post; but I think, the treaty having been clearly violated by the Indians themselves, this hunting right is entirely lost to them, if we so declare it.”
The foregoing extracts from letters and official correspondence which passed between high dignitaries of the Government, who were supposed not only to be thoroughly conversant with Indian affairs, but to represent the civil and military phase of the question, will, when read in connection with the statements of the superintendent and agent of the Indians, and that of the chief, Little Rock, give the reader some idea of the origin and character of the difficulties between the whites and Indians in the summer and fall of 1868. The tabulated list of depredations by Indians, accompanying the chapter descriptive of General Forsyth’s campaign, will give more extended information in a condensed form.
While Forsyth was moving his detachment of scouts through the valleys of the Republican, in the northwestern portion of Kansas, General Sheridan had also arranged to have a well-equipped force operating south of the Arkansas river, and in this way to cause the two favorite haunts of the Indians to be overrun simultaneously, and thus prevent them when driven from one haunt from fleeing in safety and unmolested to another. The expedition intended to operate south of the Arkansas was composed of the principal portion of the Seventh Cavalry and a few companies of the Third Regular Infantry, the entire force under command of Brigadier-General Alfred Sully, an officer of long experience among the Indians, and one who had in times gone by achieved no little distinction as an Indian fighter, and at a later date became a partial advocate of the adoption of the peace policy. General Sully’s expedition, after being thoroughly equipped and supplied, under his personal supervision, with everything needful in a campaign such as was about to be undertaken, crossed the Arkansas river about the 1st of September, at Fort Dodge, and marching a little west of south struck the Cimarron river, where they first encountered Indians. From the Cimarron the troops moved in a southeasterly direction, one day’s march to Beaver creek, the savages opposing and fighting them during the entire day. That night the Indians came close enough to fire into the camp, an unusual proceeding in Indian warfare, as they rarely molest troops during the hours of night. The next day General Sully directed his march down the valley of the Beaver; but just as his troops were breaking camp, the long wagon train having already “pulled out,” and the rear guard of the troops having barely got into their saddles, a party of between two and three hundred warriors, who had evidently in some inexplicable manner contrived to conceal their approach until the proper moment, dashed into the deserted camp within a few yards of the rear of the troops, and succeeded in cutting off a few led horses and two of the cavalrymen who, as is so often the case, had lingered a moment behind the column. General Sully and staff were at that moment near the head of the column, a mile or more from camp. The General, as was his custom on the march, being comfortably stowed away in his ambulance, of course it was impossible that he or his staff, from their great distance from the scene of actual attack, could give the necessary orders in the case.
Fortunately, the acting adjutant of the cavalry, Brevet Captain A. E. Smith, was riding at the rear of the column and witnessed the attack of the Indians. Captain Hamilton of the cavalry was also present in command of the rear guard. Wheeling his guard to the right about, he at once prepared to charge the Indians and to attempt the rescue of the two troopers who were being carried off as prisoners before his very eyes. At the same time Captain Smith, as representative of the commanding officer of the cavalry, promptly took the responsibility of directing a squadron of cavalry to wheel out of column and advance in support of Captain Hamilton’s guard. With this hastily formed detachment, the Indians, still within pistol range, but moving off with their prisoners, were gallantly charged and so closely pressed that they were forced to relinquish possession of one of their prisoners, but not before shooting him through the body and leaving him on the ground, as they supposed, mortally wounded. The troops continued to charge the retreating Indians, upon whom they were gaining, determined if possible to effect the rescue of their remaining comrade. They were advancing down one slope while the Indians just across a ravine were endeavoring to escape with their prisoner up the opposite ascent, when a peremptory order reached the officers commanding the pursuing force to withdraw their men and reform the column at once. Delaying only long enough for an ambulance to arrive from the train in which to transport their wounded comrade, the order was obeyed. Upon rejoining the column the two officers named were summoned before the officer commanding their regiment, and, after a second-hand reprimand, were ordered in arrest and their sabres taken from them, for leaving the column without orders—the attempted and half successful rescue of their comrades and the repulse of the Indians to the contrary notwithstanding. Fortunately wiser and better-natured counsels prevailed in a few hours, and their regimental commander was authorized to release these two officers from their brief durance, their sabres were restored to them, and they became, as they deserved, the recipients of numerous complimentary expressions from their brother officers. The terrible fate awaiting the unfortunate trooper carried off by the Indians spread a deep gloom throughout the command. All were too familiar with the horrid customs of the savages to hope for a moment that the captive would be reserved for aught but a slow lingering death, from torture the most horrible and painful which savage, bloodthirsty minds could suggest. Such was in truth his sad fate, as we learned afterwards when peace (?) was established with the tribes then engaged in war. Never shall I forget the consummate coolness and particularity of detail with which some of the Indians engaged in the affair related to myself and party the exact process by which the captured trooper was tortured to death; how he was tied to a stake, strips of flesh cut from his body, arms, and legs, burning brands thrust into the bleeding wounds, the nose, lips, and ears cut off, and finally, when from loss of blood, excessive pain, and anguish, the poor, bleeding, almost senseless mortal fell to the ground exhausted, the younger Indians were permitted to rush in and despatch him with their knives.
The expedition proceeded on down the valley of Beaver creek, the Indians contesting every step of the way. In the afternoon, about three o’clock, the troops arrived at a ridge of sand-hills, a few miles southeast of the present site of “Camp Supply,” where quite a determined engagement took place with the savages, the three tribes, Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Kiowas, being the assailants. The Indians seemed to have reserved their strongest efforts until the troops and train had advanced well into the sand-hills, when a most obstinate and well-conducted resistance was offered to the further advance of the troops. It was evident to many of the officers, and no doubt to the men, that the troops were probably nearing the location of the Indian villages, and that this last display of opposition to their further advance was to save the villages. The character of the country immediately about the troops was not favorable to the operations of cavalry; the surface of the rolling plain was cut up by irregular and closely located sand-hills, too steep and sandy to allow cavalry to move with freedom, yet capable of being easily cleared of savages by troops fighting on foot. The Indians took post on the hilltops and began a harassing fire on the troops and train. Had the infantry been unloaded from the wagons promptly, instead of adding to the great weight, sinking the wheels sometimes almost in to the axles, and had they, with the assistance of a few of the dismounted cavalry, been deployed on both sides of the train, the latter could have been safely conducted through what was then decided to be impassable sand-hills, but which were a short time afterward proved to be perfectly practicable. And once beyond the range of sand-hills but a short distance, the villages of the attacking warriors would have been found exposed to an easy and important capture, probably terminating the campaign by compelling a satisfactory peace. Captain Yates, with his single troop of cavalry, was ordered forward to drive the Indians away. This was a proceeding which did not seem to meet with favor from the savages. Captain Yates could drive them wherever he encountered them, but it was only to cause the redskins to appear in increased numbers at some other threatened point. After contending in this non-effective manner for a couple of hours, the impression arose in the minds of some that the train could not be conducted through the sand-hills in the face of the strong opposition offered by the Indians. The order was issued to turn about and withdraw. This order was executed, and the troop and train, followed by the exultant Indians, retired a few miles to the Beaver, and encamped for the night on the ground now known as “Camp Supply.”
Captain Yates had caused to be brought off the field, when his troop was ordered to retire, the body of one of his men who had been slain in the fight by the Indians. As the troops were to continue their backward movement next day, and it was impossible to transport the dead body further, Captain Yates ordered preparations made for interring it in camp that night; but knowing that the Indians would thoroughly search the deserted camp-ground almost before the troops should get out of sight, and would be quick with their watchful eyes to detect a grave, and if successful in discovering it would unearth the body in order to obtain the scalp, directions were given to prepare the grave after nightfall, and the spot selected would have baffled the eye of any one but that of an Indian. The grave was dug under the picket line to which the seventy or eighty horses of the troops would be tethered during the night, so that their constant tramping and pawing should completely cover up and obliterate all traces of the grave containing the body of the dead trooper. The following morning even those who had performed the sad rites of burial to their fallen comrade could scarcely have been able to indicate the exact location of the grave. Yet when we returned to that point a few weeks afterward it was discovered that the wily savages had found the grave, unearthed the body, and removed the scalp of their victim, on the day following the interment.