Early on the morning succeeding the fight in the sand-hills General Sully resumed his march toward Fort Dodge, the Indians following and harassing the movements of the troops until about two o’clock in the afternoon, when, apparently satisfied with their success in forcing the expedition back, thus relieving their villages and themselves from the danger which had threatened them, they fired their parting shots and rode off in triumph. That night the troops camped on Bluff creek, from which point General Sully proceeded to Fort Dodge, on the Arkansas, leaving the main portion of the command in camp on Bluff creek, where we shall see them again.
XII.
In a late chapter I promised to submit testimony from those high in authority, now the highest, showing that among those who had given the subject the most thoughtful attention, the opinion was unanimous in favor of the “abolition of the civil Indian agents and licensed traders,” and the transfer of the Indian Bureau back to the War Department, where it originally belonged. The question as to which cabinet minister, the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Interior, should retain control of the bureau regulating Indian affairs, has long been and still is one of unending discussion, and is of far more importance to the country than the casual observer might imagine. The army as a unit, and from motives of peace and justice, favors giving this control to the Secretary of War. Opposed to this view is a large, powerful, and at times unscrupulous party, many of whose strongest adherents are dependent upon the fraudulent practices and profits of which the Indian is the victim for the acquirement of dishonest wealth—practices and profits which only exist so long as the Indian Bureau is under the supervision of the Interior Department. The reasons in favor of the War Department having the control of the government of the Indians exist at all times. But the struggle for this control seems to make its appearance, like an epidemic, at certain periods, and for a brief time will attract considerable comment and discussion both in and out of Congress, then disappear from public view. To a candid, impartial mind I believe the reasons why the Indians should be controlled by the Department of War, the department which must assume the reins of power when any real control is exercised, are convincing. It may be asked, Then why, if the reasons are so convincing, are not proper representations made to the authorities at Washington and the transfer secured? This inquiry seems natural enough. But the explanation is sufficiently simple. The army officers, particularly those stationed on the frontier, have but little opportunity, even had they the desire, to submit their views or recommendations to Congress as a body or to members individually. When impressed with ideas whose adoption is deemed essential to the Government, the usual and recognized mode of presenting them for consideration is by written communications forwarded through the intermediate and superior commanders until laid before the Secretary of War, by whom, if considered sufficiently important, they are submitted to the President, and by him to Congress. Having made this recommendation and furnished the Department with his reasons therefor, an officer considers that he has discharged his duty in the premises, and the responsibility of the adoption or rejection of his ideas then rests with a superior power. Beyond the conscientious discharge of his duty he has no interest, certainly none of a pecuniary nature, to serve. In the periodical contests which prevail between the military and civil aspirants for the control of the Indian Bureau, the military content themselves as above stated with a brief and unbiassed presentation of their views, and having submitted their argument to the proper tribunal, no further steps are taken to influence the decision. Not so with those advocating the claims of the civil agents and traders to public recognition. The preponderance of testimony and the best of the argument rest with the military. But there are many ways of illustrating that the battle is not always to the strong nor the race to the swift. The ways of Congress are sometimes peculiar—not to employ a more expressive term.
Under the Constitution of the United States there are but two houses of Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives, and most people residing within the jurisdiction of its laws suppose this to be the extent of the legislative body; but to those acquainted with the internal working of that important branch of the Government, there is still a third house of Congress, better known as the lobby. True, its existence is neither provided for nor recognized by law; yet it exists nevertheless, and so powerful, although somewhat hidden, is its influence upon the other branches of Congress, that almost any measure it is interested in becomes a law. It is somewhat remarkable that those measures which are plainly intended to promote the public interests are seldom agitated or advocated in the third house, while those measures of doubtful propriety or honesty usually secure the almost undivided support of the lobby. There are few prominent questions connected with the feeble policy of the Government which can and do assemble so powerful and determined a lobby as a proposed interference with the system of civilian superintendents, agents, and traders for the Indians. Let but some member of Congress propose to inquire into the workings of the management of the Indians, or propose a transfer of the bureau to the War Department, and the leaders of the combination opposed raise a cry which is as effective in rallying their supporters as was the signal of Roderick Dhu. From almost every State and territory the retainers of the bureau flock to the national capital. Why this rallying of the clans? Is there any principle involved? With the few, yes; with the many, no. Then what is the mighty influence which brings together this hungry host? Why this determined opposition to any interference with the management of the Indians? I remember making this inquiry years ago, and the answer then, which is equally applicable now, was: “There is too much money in the Indian question to allow it to pass into other hands.” This I believe to be the true solution of our difficulties with the Indians at the present day. It seems almost incredible that a policy which is claimed and represented to be based on sympathy for the red man and a desire to secure to him his rights, is shaped in reality and manipulated behind the scenes with the distinct and sole object of reaping a rich harvest by plundering both the Government and the Indians. To do away with the vast army of agents, traders, and civilian employees which is a necessary appendage of the civilian policy, would be to deprive many members of Congress of a vast deal of patronage which they now enjoy. There are few, if any, more comfortable or desirable places of disposing of a friend who has rendered valuable political service or electioneering aid, than to secure for him the appointment of Indian agent. The salary of an agent is comparatively small. Men without means, however, eagerly accept the position; and in a few years, at furthest, they almost invariably retire in wealth. Who ever heard of a retired Indian agent or trader in limited circumstances? How do they realize fortunes upon so small a salary? In the disposition of the annuities provided for the Indians by the Government, the agent is usually the distributing medium. Between himself and the Indian there is no system of accountability, no vouchers given or received, no books kept, in fact no record except the statement which the agent chooses to forward to his superintendent.
The Indian has no means of knowing how much in value or how many presents of any particular kind the Government, the “Great Father” as he terms it, has sent him. For knowledge on this point he must accept the statement of the agent. The goods sent by the Government are generally those which would most please an Indian’s fancy. The Indian trader usually keeps goods of a similar character. The trader is most frequently a particular friend of the agent, often associated with him in business, and in many instances holds his position of trader at the instance of the agent. They are always located near each other. The trader is usually present at the distribution of annuities. If the agent, instead of distributing to the Indians all of the goods intended for them by the Government, only distributes one half and retains the other half, who is to be the wiser? Not the Indian, defrauded though he may be, for he is ignorant of how much is coming to him. The word of the agent is his only guide. He may complain a little, express some disappointment at the limited amount of presents, and intimate that the “Great Father” has dealt out the annuities with a sparing hand; but the agent explains it by referring to some depredations which he knows the tribe to have been guilty of in times past; or if he is not aware of any particular instance of guilt, he charges them generally with having committed such acts, knowing one can scarcely go amiss in accusing a tribe of occasionally slaying a white man, and ends up his charge by informing them that the “Great Father,” learning of these little irregularities in their conduct and being pained greatly thereat, felt compelled to reduce their allowance of blankets, sugar, coffee, etc., when at the same time the missing portion of said allowance is safely secured in the storehouse of the agent near by. Well, but how can he enrich himself in this manner? it may be asked. By simply, and unseen by the Indians, transferring the unissued portion of the annuities from his government storehouse to the trading establishment of his friend the trader. There the boxes are unpacked and their contents spread out for barter with the Indians. The latter, in gratifying their wants, are forced to purchase from the trader at prices which are scores of times the value of the article offered. I have seen Indians dispose of buffalo robes to traders, which were worth from fifteen to twenty dollars each, and get in return only ten to twenty cups of brown sugar, the entire value of which did not exceed two or three dollars. This is one of the many ways agents and traders have of amassing sudden wealth. I have known the head chiefs of a tribe to rise in a council in the presence of other chiefs and of officers of the army, and accuse his agent, then present, of these or similar dishonest practices. Is it to be wondered at that the position of agent or trader among the Indians is greatly sought after by men determined to become rich, but not particular as to the manner of doing so? Or is it to be wondered at that army officers, who are often made aware of the injustice done the Indian yet are powerless to prevent it, and who trace many of our difficulties with the Indians to these causes, should urge the abolishment of a system which has proven itself so fruitful in fraud and dishonest dealing toward those whose interests it should be their duty to protect?
In offering the testimony which follows, and which to those at all interested in the subject of our dealings with the Indian must have no little weight, I have given that of men whose interest in the matter could only spring from experience and a supposed thorough knowledge of the Indian character, and a desire to do justice to him as well as to the Government. At the present writing a heavy cloud portending a general Indian war along our entire frontier, from the British possessions on the north to the Mexican border on the south, hangs threateningly over us. Whether it will really result in war or in isolated acts of barbarity remains to be seen. But enough is known to prove that the day has not yet arrived when the lawless savage of the plains is prepared or willing to abandon his favorite pastime of war and depredation upon the defenceless frontier, and instead to settle quietly down and study the arts and callings of a quiet and peaceful life. It is impossible for the Indian to comprehend the force of any law or regulation which is not backed up by a power sufficiently strong to compel its observance. This is not surprising, as a large proportion of their white brethren are equally obtuse. Lieutenant-General Sheridan showed his thorough appreciation of the Indian character, in an endorsement recently written by him upon a complaint relating to Indian depredations, forwarded from one of his subordinates to the War Department. General Sheridan writes, “We can never stop the wild Indians from murdering and stealing until we punish them. If a white man in this country commits a murder, we hang him; if he steals a horse, we put him in the penitentiary. If an Indian commits these crimes, we give him better fare and more blankets. I think I may say with reason, that under this policy the civilization of the wild red man will progress slowly.”
As might naturally be expected, a massacre like that at Fort Phil Kearny, in which ninety-one enlisted men and three officers were slain outright, and no one left to tell the tale, excited discussion and comment throughout the land, and raised inquiry as to who was responsible for this lamentable affair. The military laid the blame at the door of the Indian Bureau with its host of civil agents and traders, and accused the latter of supplying the Indians with the arms and ammunition which were afterward turned against the whites. The supporters of the Indian Bureau not only did not deny the accusation, but went so far as to claim that all our difficulties with the Indians could be traced to the fact that the military commanders, particularly Generals Hancock and Cooke, had forbidden the traders from furnishing the Indians with arms and ammunition. This was the official statement of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the spring of 1867. It was rather a queer complaint upon which to justify a war that, because the Government would not furnish the savages with implements for murdering its subjects in approved modern method, these same savages would therefore be reluctantly forced to murder and scalp such settlers and travellers as fell in their paths, in the old-fashioned tomahawk, bow and arrow style. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in his report to the Secretary of the Interior in the spring of 1867, labored hard to find a justification for the Indians in their recent outbreak at Fort Phil Kearny. The withholding of arms and ammunition from the Indians seemed to be the principal grievance. As the views of the Commissioner find many supporters in quarters remote from the scene of Indian depredations, and among persons who still cling to the traditionary Indian, as wrought by the pen of Cooper, as their ideal red man, I quote the Commissioner’s words: “An order issued by General Cooke at Omaha on the 31st of July last, in relation to arms and ammunition, has had a very bad effect. I am satisfied that such orders are not only unwise but really cruel, and therefore calculated to produce the very worst effect. Indians are men, and when hungry will like others resort to any means to obtain food; and as the chase is their only means of subsistence, if you deprive them of the power of procuring it, you certainly produce great dissatisfaction. If it were true that arms and ammunition could be accumulated by them to war against us, it would certainly be unwise to give it to them, but this is not the fact. No Indian will buy two guns. One he absolutely needs; and as he has no means of taking care of powder, he necessarily will take, when offered to him, but a very limited quantity. It is true that formerly they hunted with bows and arrows, killing buffalo, antelope, and deer with the same; but to hunt successfully with bow and arrows requires horses, and as the valleys of that country are now more or less filled with white men prospecting for gold and silver, their means of subsisting their horses have passed away, and they now have but few horses. I mention these facts so as to place before the country, as briefly as possible, the condition as well as the wants of the Indians.”
Unfortunately for the Commissioner, his premises were entirely wrong, and his conclusions necessarily so. It is a difficult task to prove that men whose habits, instincts, and training incline them to deeds of murder, will be less apt to commit those deeds, provided we place in their hands every implement and facility for their commission; yet such in effect was the reasoning of the Commissioner. Where or from whom he could have obtained the opinions he expressed, it is difficult to understand. He certainly derived no such ideas from a personal knowledge of the Indians themselves. How well his statements bear examination: “If it were true that arms and ammunition could be accumulated by them to war against us, it would certainly be worse to give it to them, but this is not the fact. No Indian will buy two guns.”
On the contrary, every person at all familiar with the conduct of the Indians knows that there is no plan or idea which they study more persistently than that of accumulating arms and ammunition, and in the successful execution of this plan they have collected, and are to-day collecting arms and ammunition of the latest and most approved pattern. This supply of arms and ammunition is not obtained for purposes of hunting, for no matter how bountifully the Indian may be supplied with firearms, his favorite and most successful mode of killing the buffalo, his principal article of food, is with the bow and arrow. It is, at the same time, the most economical mode, as the arrows, after being lodged in the bodies of the buffalo, may be recovered unimpaired, and be used repeatedly. “No Indian will buy two guns!” If the honorable Commissioner had added the words, provided he can steal them, his statement would be heartily concurred in. From a knowledge of the facts, I venture the assertion that there is scarcely an Indian on the plains, no matter how fully armed and equipped, but will gladly barter almost anything he owns, of proper value, in exchange for good arms and ammunition. Even if his personal wants in this respect are satisfied, the Indian is too shrewd at driving a bargain to throw away any opportunity of possessing himself of arms or ammunition, as among his comrades he is aware that no other articles of trade command the prices that are paid for implements of war. An Indian may not desire two guns for his own use, but he will buy or procure one gun and one or more revolvers as a part of his equipment for war, and there are few of the chiefs and warriors of the plains who to-day are not the possessors of at least one breech-loading rifle or carbine, and from one to two revolvers. This can be vouched for by any officer who has been brought in contact with the hostile Indians of late years. As to the Indian not having proper means to take care of his ammunition, experience has shown that when he goes into action he carries a greater number of rounds of ammunition than do our soldiers, and in time of peace he exercises far better care of his supply than do our men. The army declared itself almost unanimously against the issue of arms to the Indians, while the traders, who were looking to the profits, and others of the Indian Bureau, proclaimed loudly in favor of the issue, unlimited and unrestrained. General Hancock, commanding at that time one of the most important and extensive of the Indian departments, issued orders to his subordinates throughout the Indian country, similar to the order referred to of General Cooke. The order simply required post commanders and other officers to prevent the issue or sale of arms and ammunition to any Indians of the plains. As we were then engaged in hostilities with nearly all the tribes, it would have been simply assisting our enemies not to adopt this course. A spontaneous outcry came from the traders who were to be affected by this order—an outcry that did not cease until it resounded in Washington. General Hancock reported his action in the matter to his next superior officer, at that time Lieutenant-General Sherman. General Sherman at once sent the following letter to General Hancock, emphatically approving the course of the latter, and reiterating the order:
Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri,
St. Louis, Missouri, January 26, 1867.