S.
We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.
M.
Locke in his 4th Book[171], and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.
S.
While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.
E.
The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception[172]. Volition or Will, Wch is not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.
Mo.
There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;” “Gold is yellow;” “Gold is fixt;” “Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.