M.
Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God[173].
M. S.
Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2d objection of Hobbs.
S.
Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.
S.
Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of [pg 050] the scholastiques—“the will wills,” &c. So does Locke. I am of another mind[174].
S.
Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.