The capture of Moscow was far from being the triumph that the French emperor had anticipated. Deceived by his recollections of Tilsit, he had fully counted upon receiving pacific overtures from Alexander or at least upon his eager acceptance of conciliatory assurances from himself. But as the weeks passed and the vision of negotiation with the Russians proved illusory, retreat became inevitable. On the night of October 18 the French army, now about 115,000 strong, evacuated Moscow. Kutuzov, who was stronger in cavalry, though perhaps still weaker in infantry, hung upon its rear, and, while avoiding a pitched battle, was able to prevent Napoleon from retreating by any other route than the now devastated line of his advance. It has often been questioned whether Kutuzov did not deliberately refrain from destroying the French army. He certainly informed Sir Robert Wilson on one occasion that he did not wish to drive Napoleon to extremities, lest his supremacy should go to the power that ruled the sea. The remark may have been nothing more than an outburst of ill-temper, but, whatever the motive, there can be no doubt as to the policy adopted. The retreating French army suffered terrible hardships from the cold, for which it was ill prepared. Twice it seemed on the point of falling into the hands of the Russians; at Krasnoe 26,000 prisoners are said to have been captured by Kutuzov's army, while at Borisov the southern army under Chichagov and the army returning from Finland under Wittgenstein joined hands, and disputed the French passage of the Berezina on November 26-29. According to Chambray's calculation, the French army numbered 31,000 combatants before the passage, of whom but 9,000 remained on December 1. All the non-combatants had been left in the hands of the enemy.

This was the last direct attack made by the Russians on the relics of the grand army. But the worst ravages of the Russian winter had yet to come. On December 3 the cold became intense. As the survivors of the expedition dragged themselves homewards through the Polish provinces, they were met by large bodies of reinforcements pouring in from the west; these recruits, comparatively fresh, were at first appalled by the gaunt and famine-stricken aspect of the returning veterans, but soon perished themselves in nearly equal numbers. It is estimated that altogether only 60,000 men recrossed the frontier out of a total of 630,000, and in the estimate of 60,000 is included Macdonald's division, which was exposed to comparatively little hardship. That division with the Prussian contingent began to fall back on December 19. On the 30th, however, the Prussians were reduced to neutrality by the convention of Tauroggen, signed by the Prussian commander, Yorck, with the Russians, without the sanction of his government. Had Russia been in a condition to press onwards at once and carry the war into French territory, it is possible that Europe might have been spared the misery and bloodshed of the next few years. But, for the moment, her strength and resources were exhausted, nor was it until months had elapsed that other nations, or even France herself, became aware of the magnitude of the catastrophe which had overtaken Napoleon's host. That he was able to rally himself after it, to carry the French people with him, to enforce a new conscription, and to assume the aggressive in the campaign of 1813, must ever remain a supreme proof of his capacity for empire.

DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED STATES.

In the year 1812 war broke out between Great Britain and the United States. For a time the continental warfare had led to a great increase in American commerce, which was free from the attacks of privateers and from the restrictions which the opposing parties placed on one another. Presently, however, both parties attempted to force the United States into a virtual alliance with themselves. Orders in council on the one side and imperial decrees on the other had, as we have seen, declared a blockade of the ports of the continent of Europe and of Great Britain, and the United States saw their commerce threatened with disabilities approximating to those suffered by the belligerent powers. President Jefferson, who was supported by the republican party, adhered to a policy of strict neutrality, and prepared to suffer any commercial loss rather than be drawn into an European war. The only action which he took was the defence of the river mouths with a view to resisting any offensive movement. The federalist party on the other hand were in favour of energetic action against France, so as to secure English favour and the great commercial privileges which the mistress of the seas could bestow. For a time no hostilities resulted, but constant irritation was caused by the British claim to a right of search and to the impressment of sailors of British nationality found on American ships, while American ships accused of infringing the blockade were seized by either of the European combatants. To some extent the differences between Great Britain and the United States depended on rival views of the law of allegiance. The British maintained the doctrine nemo potest exuere patriam, and regarded all British-born persons, unless absolved from their allegiance by the act of the mother-country, as British subjects. The law of the United States, on the other hand, permitted an alien to become a citizen after fourteen years' residence, and previously to 1798 had required a residence of five years only. In this way it often happened that sailors who had received the American citizenship were impressed for service on British ships, and sometimes sailors of actual American birth were impressed. But it was impossible to justify the practice to which the Americans resorted of receiving deserters of British nationality from British ships of war, who were induced by offers of higher pay to transfer themselves to the American service.

Jefferson at first preferred to coerce the European powers by retaliatory legislation. As early as April, 1806, a law had been passed forbidding the importation of certain British wares, but was suspended six weeks after it came into operation. In June, 1807, irritation was intensified by the incident of the Leopard and the Chesapeake. Five men, four of whom were British born and one an American by birth, were known to have deserted from the British sloop Halifax, lying in Hampton roads, and to have taken service on an American frigate, the Chesapeake. After application for their surrender had been made in vain to the magistrates of the town of Norfolk, where the Chesapeake's rendezvous was, and to the officer commanding the rendezvous, Vice-admiral Berkeley sent his flagship, the Leopard, carrying fifty guns, with an order to the British captains on the North American station to search the Chesapeake for deserters from six ships named, including the Halifax, in case she should be encountered on the high seas. The Leopard arrived in Chesapeake bay in time to follow the Chesapeake beyond American waters, and then made a demand to search for deserters. On the captain of the Chesapeake refusing compliance, the Leopard opened fire. The Chesapeake was not in a condition to make any effectual reply, and, after receiving three broadsides, struck her flag. Only one of the deserters from the Halifax, an Englishman, was found on the Chesapeake; but three deserters from the British warship Melampus, which had not been named in Berkeley's order, all Americans by birth, were removed from the Chesapeake, which was now permitted to return to port.[55] Although the British government offered reparation for this action, recalled Berkeley, and disavowed the right to search ships of war for deserters, the incident could not fail to make a bad impression on American opinion.

But still Jefferson adhered to a policy of pacific coercion. In December, 1807, the act of April, 1806, was again put into force, and an embargo act, passed by the American congress, now cut off all foreign countries from trade with the United States. But the policy of embargo was disastrous to its promoters. It ruined the commerce and emptied the treasury of the United States. On March 1, 1809, a non-intercourse act, applying only to France, Great Britain, and their dependencies, was substituted for the embargo act.[56] The new act enabled the president to remove the embargo against whichever country should cancel its orders or decrees against American trade. Three days later Jefferson was succeeded by Madison as President of the United States. The change made no difference to the policy of the United States government. But the opposition was now much stronger and more violent than formerly; so much so that Sir James Craig, the Canadian governor, actually despatched a spy, John Henry, to sound the willingness of New England, where the federalist party was the stronger, to secede from the union and join Great Britain against the United States. This venture becomes the less surprising when we observe that in the previous year, 1808, John Quincy Adams, the future president, had predicted such a secession. Nothing, however, came of the attempt. Madison attempted to obtain concessions from the British government, but while the Perceval ministry lasted he met with no success. In May, 1810, the non-intercourse act expired, but a proviso was enacted that, if before March 3, 1811, either Great Britain or France should cancel her decrees against American trade the act should, three months after such revocation, revive against the power that maintained its decrees. Madison was cajoled into believing that Napoleon had recalled his decrees on November 1, 1810, and the non-intercourse act was accordingly revived against Great Britain and her dependencies in February, 1811.

WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES.

Almost the first act of the Liverpool administration was to cancel the restrictions on American trade. But it was too late. Five days earlier the United States had declared war against Great Britain on June 18, 1812. The explanation of this step must be sought in the party politics of the United States. While the federalists courted British alliance, the younger members of the republican party had conceived a hope of conquering Canada as a result of a victorious war against Great Britain. This was the reply of the national party in the United States to the action of the Canadian governor. Madison knew the impracticability of such a step, but, finding that he could only carry the presidential election of 1812 with the support of this section of his party, he declared war. Great Britain, with her best troops in the Peninsula, was in no condition to use her full strength in America, but the United States were entirely unprepared for war. Their treasury was still empty, and their army and navy were small, while Canada generally was contented and loyal to the British crown. Upper Canada was full of loyalists, who had been expelled from the revolted colonies, and who with their descendants hated the men that had driven them from their homes; lower Canada was half-French and had nothing in common with the United States, while the Roman catholic clergy threw the whole weight of their influence on the British side. General Hull, who commanded the forces employed against Canada, succeeded in crossing the river Detroit in July and threatened the British post of Malden. But an alliance with the Indians enabled the British first to possess themselves of Mackinac, at the junction of lakes Huron and Michigan, and afterwards to imperil Hull's communications through the Michigan territory.

Hull accordingly fell back on Detroit. The British, with 750 men under Major-General Brock, together with 600 Indians, now prepared to attack Hull at that place. Hull, who believed his retreat to be cut off by the Indians, did not await the British attack, but surrendered on August 16 with 2,500 men and thirty-three guns. The effect of the capitulation was to place the British in effectual possession, not merely of Detroit, but of the territory of Michigan, and thus to render any attack on Canada from that quarter extremely difficult. The advantages gained by the British through this success were unfortunately neutralised by the policy pursued by Sir George Prevost, who had succeeded Craig as governor of Canada. Prevost was of opinion that, when the news of the withdrawal of the orders in council reached Washington, the United States government would be ready to abandon hostilities; and he accordingly concluded a provisional armistice with General Dearborn, the commander-in-chief of the enemy's forces in the northern states. But President Madison, having engaged in war, was anxious to try the effect of another attack on Canada before negotiating for peace, and therefore declined to ratify the armistice. The interval enabled the United States to bring up reinforcements, but their new army failed in an attack on a British post on the Maumee river.

Meanwhile a second attempt was made to invade Upper Canada, this time from the side of Niagara. On October 13, Brigadier-General Wadsworth, acting under the orders of General Van Rensselaer, led an attack on the British position of Queenstown on the Canadian bank of the Niagara river. Brock commanded the defence, but was killed early in the fight. The position was momentarily seized by the enemy, but was presently recaptured by the British, who had in the meantime been reinforced by Major-General Sheaffe, the son of a loyalist, with a force from Fort George, and before the day closed Wadsworth found himself compelled to surrender with 900 men. The remainder of the enemy's forces, consisting of militia, rather than exceed their military obligations by crossing the frontier, chose to leave these men to their fate. In spite of the ignominious surrenders with which the first two expeditions against Canada had terminated, a third attempt was made by Brigadier-General Smyth to force the Canadian frontier; but on November 28 he was repulsed with loss by the British under Bishopp between Chippewa and Fort Erie, above the Niagara Falls, and at the end of the year the Canadian frontier still remained unpierced.