AMERICAN SUCCESSES AT SEA.
The glory of the British military successes was unfortunately obscured in large measure by American successes on the sea. The maritime war resolved itself into a series of fights between individual frigates. This was the necessary result of the nature of the British force kept in American waters. Ever since the renewal of hostilities with France in 1803 a species of blockade had been maintained along the coast of the United States by British vessels on the watch for deserters or contraband of war. It was also found necessary to employ ships of war to guard against pirates in the West Indies and to protect British commerce in that quarter against French privateers. For all these purposes speed was of more importance than strength, and the British force in the west contained a disproportionate number of smaller vessels as compared with line of battle ships. The actual numbers of British warships in North American waters at the beginning of 1812 were three ships of the line, twenty-one cruisers and frigates, and fifty-three small craft. The United States navy was still weaker, and amounted merely to seven efficient frigates and nine small craft.[57] There was no question of a contest between fleets, and though the numbers of the British warships enabled them to destroy American trade, they were ship for ship inferior to the American frigates, which were thus enabled to win an empty glory in single-ship encounters. The American frigates were, in fact, superior in every respect to the British ships which nominally belonged to the same class. They were larger and more strongly built, a frigate being as strong as a British seventy-four. Their crews were more numerous, and were recruited entirely from seamen, about one-third of whom would appear to have been of British nationality, while, as has been seen, many of them had been decoyed from British war-vessels by offers of higher pay. The British ships on the other hand were manned largely by landsmen, often impressed from the jails. A false economy had induced the British admiralty to impose narrow limits on the use of ammunition for gunnery practice. The Americans on the other hand were very liberal in this respect, with the result that in the early years of the war they were greatly superior to their enemies in point of marksmanship.
A good example of the disproportion between the British and American frigates is furnished by the fight between the British frigate Guerrière and the American frigate Constitution, on August 19, one of the first naval actions in the war. The Guerrière was armed with twenty-four broadside guns, discharging projectiles with a total weight of 517 pounds; the Constitution with twenty-eight broadside guns, discharging a weight of 768 pounds. The crew of the Guerrière, counting men only, numbered 244, that of the Constitution with a similar limitation 460. Finally the Guerrière's tonnage amounted to 1,092, as against the Constitution's 1,533. The Guerrière's guns proved very ineffectual from the start, while the marksmanship, not only of the American gunners but of the riflemen in the Constitution's tops, was the wonder of the British. It is stated that none of her shot fell short. After a fight lasting nearly two hours the Guerrière surrendered. The ship was a complete wreck, and she had lost fifteen men killed and six mortally wounded as against seven killed and three mortally wounded on board her opponent.
The effect of the engagement both on British and on American public opinion was altogether out of proportion to its intrinsic importance. The inequality in strength of the opposing frigates was not understood, and any defeat of the mistress of the seas seemed an event of considerable significance. The Americans soon met with other similar successes. On October 18 their sloop Wasp, of eighteen guns, reduced the British sloop Frolic, a weaker vessel, though of similar armament, to a helpless hulk after a ten minutes' cannonade. The moral effect of this victory was not impaired by the fact that the conqueror and her prize were compelled to surrender a few hours later to the British seventy-four Poictiers. On the 25th the United States, of forty-four guns, captured the Macedonian, of thirty-eight, after three hours' fighting, and on December 29 the British thirty-eight-gun frigate Java, with a very inexperienced crew, was captured by the Constitution after a running fight of three hours and a half.[58]
THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN OF 1813.
With the retreat of the French army from Russia the main scene of operations on the continent was shifted from Russia to Germany. Great Britain took little part in the actual warfare in Germany, and if she had a larger share in the political negotiations which ultimately determined the distribution of forces, still Austria and not Great Britain was the power whose diplomacy had most effect on the course of events. The upheaval of Europe against Napoleon, however, would have been much less effective if it had not been supported by English subsidies, and Austria, in the crippled state of her finances, would probably have had to remain inactive if she had not been able to rely on English gold and perhaps still more on English credit.
The campaign of 1813 falls naturally into three parts. During the first, from the beginning of January to the latter part of April the victorious Russians swept over North Germany, and, carrying the Prussian monarchy with them, strengthened a reaction which had already begun against the rule of Napoleon. The second part began with the arrival of Napoleon on the scene of action towards the end of April and lasted to the conclusion of an armistice on June 4. In this period of seven or eight weeks the allies were forced to retire at all points and the war was carried into Prussian territory. The armistice, which terminated on August 10, preceded the opening of the third part of the campaign in which Russia and Prussia were joined by Austria and Sweden, and, after gradually drawing closer round the main French position in Saxony, finally inflicted a crushing defeat upon Napoleon at Leipzig in the middle of October. The campaign was virtually over when Napoleon secured his retreat by the victory of Hanau on October 30; but it is impossible to sever it from the events outside Germany which were directly occasioned by the downfall of Napoleon's German domination. These are the revolt of Holland in November, that of Switzerland in December, and the Austrian attack on Northern Italy in October and November.
In the opening months of the campaign the movements were merely a sequel to those of the previous year. The French retreat was continued from the Niemen to the Vistula, the Elbe, and finally the Saale. The Russians entered Prussia proper a few days after Yorck's capitulation, and the French retired before them. Stein, the Prussian statesman who had received a commission from Russia to administer the Prussian districts occupied by her, ordered the provincial governor to convoke an assembly. Although some indignation was felt at such a step being taken by Russian orders, the assembly met and voted the formation of the Landwehr. In this way Prussia actually began to arm against France, while the Prussian government still professed to maintain the French alliance. A few days later King Frederick William left Berlin, which was still occupied by the French, for Breslau. Before the end of February he had concluded the treaty of Kalisch with Russia, by which the two powers were to conduct the war against France conjointly, and Russia was not to lay down her arms till Prussia should be restored to a strength equal to that which she had possessed in 1806. On March 2 Cathcart arrived at Kalisch as British ambassador to the Russian court. He actively promoted Russia's alliance with Prussia, from which Great Britain stood apart for the present. He was able to obtain from Prussia a renunciation of her claims on Hanover, but Frederick William was still opposed to any increase of Hanoverian territory. On the 17th Prussia declared war on France. By that time the Russians had entered both Berlin and Breslau, and had freed Hamburg from French dominion, thus reopening Germany to British commerce. The declaration of war by Prussia was accompanied by a convention with Russia providing for the deliverance of Germany and the dissolution of the confederation of the Rhine. This convention embodied Stein's policy. It relied on popular support and it aimed at an unified government, at least in the territories occupied at that date by adherents of France.
THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN OF 1813.
But the popular upheaval in Germany was confined to the kingdom of Prussia, and the attempt to spread it elsewhere only provoked distrust in Austria and the South German states; it was not until the conservative elements in Germany were won over by Metternich's policy that the anti-Napoleonic movement became truly national. For the present Austria played the part of mediator. Lord Walpole, who had been sent on a secret errand to Vienna in December, 1812, tried in vain to win Austria to the side of the allies by promising the restoration of the Tyrol, Illyria, and Venetia.[59] Her government would probably have preferred a reconciliation with France, which would have arrested the growth of Russia and left Germany divided, to a unified Germany such as Stein desired; but Metternich, who directed her policy, cherished little hope of the success of his endeavours, though he knew when to employ agents more optimistic than himself. The Austrian treasury was empty, and it therefore suited Austria to remain neutral as long as possible, while in the event of a doubtful struggle this very neutrality would raise the price of her ultimate alliance. It was in this way that she came at last to exercise a decisive voice in the resettlement of Germany, not to say of Europe. True to this policy, the Austrian court concluded a truce of indefinite duration with Russia at the beginning of the year, and withdrew its forces within its own borders. This was followed by an offer of mediation made to France, which was, however, declined. A renewed offer was declined early in April by both France and Great Britain. The British still distrusted Austria, while France desired to buy her active co-operation and made an offer of Silesia in return for an army of 100,000, should Prussia or Russia open hostilities. Austria did not, however, abandon her project, but notified Prussia and Russia that she would proceed with the task of armed mediation, and steadily busied herself with military preparations.