A brief course in the teaching process

by George D. Strayer

CHAPTER V
THE INDUCTIVE LESSON

We are skeptical to-day of that sort of teaching which aims mainly to equip children with a body of accepted knowledge in order that they may some time find use for this body of information in later life. We emphasize, rather, the control of mental activity which makes for the discovery of truth and the avoidance of error. Thinking of this sort is purposeful. We control or direct our ideas toward some end, toward the solution of some problem. One great purpose of teaching must be to provide the opportunity and the stimulus for this kind of thinking. We may not be able to lay down any fixed order of procedure, nor to devise any set of rules whereby children may be trained to be good reasoners; but we can consider what is involved in the process, point out the possibilities of interference, and suggest some of the means to be employed in encouraging this type of mental activity on the part of children. In this chapter we shall confine ourselves to that type of reasoning which we call inductive. This type of schoolroom exercise has usually been treated as composed of five steps; namely, preparation, presentation, comparison and abstraction, generalization, and application. We shall employ this classification to guide us in our discussion of the process.

Preparation: To prepare a child to reason in a given situation from the data in hand to the conclusions which must of necessity follow, it is first of all necessary that he should see that the situation presents a problem. We reason only when we have some aim or purpose which can be satisfied by the process. But if consciousness of aim or problem is at the foundation of this type of thinking, and if we are to deal with children in groups, it is essential that the situation which involves the problem be made the common possession of all. The step of preparation presents these two problems to the teacher: (1) to find a basis in experience already had, or to provide the experience which involves the problem to be considered; (2) to make the children feel the necessity for the solution, i.e. to make the problem vital to them.

In considering the necessity for common experience as a basis for discovering the problem to children, we are dealing with the principle of apperception. Briefly stated, it is this,—that any object or situation has meaning for us only as it connects itself with and is interpreted by our previous experience. Suppose, for example, that a group of first-grade children were asked to tell what made seeds grow. It is possible that some of them would not know, could not interpret from past experience, the meaning of seeds. If the class were at work in a large city, we could be sure that many had never been conscious that growing plants had any connection with seeds, and there would be few, if any, who had ever noticed the conditions under which such growth takes place. The first problem for the teacher in this case would be solved only when, through recall of past experiences, observations, or experiments, the experience “seeds growing” became the common possession of the group. This is an extreme case, one in which the experience which involves the problem is entirely wanting. At the other end of the series, we may have a problem for consideration, the basis for which is found in experiences common to all children. But even though this be the case, there will still be need for the recall of the experience and for making prominent some factor heretofore unnoticed before the children will be ready to reason. We may suppose that all children have had experience with streets or roads, but we shall want to recall many of these experiences in order to make significant the problem of transportation which we wish to consider in the class in home geography.

The step of preparation has only partially accomplished its purpose when the experience necessary to the realization of the problem has been recalled or provided. Still greater skill is required in making the child conscious of the problem. Indeed, it may well be argued that in the curriculum as it is at present organized, very many of the problems that we ask children to solve are problems for them only because we, as teachers, require that that certain piece of work be done. Often the child’s problem consists mainly in avoiding, as far as possible, the work which we require, which has little or no significance for him. Children would do much more thinking if we were only more careful to give them childish problems to solve. Too frequently the organization of knowledge which we impose is influenced exclusively by our adult logical conceptions. Not that children should be illogical, but rather that child logic and the child’s ability to reason depend upon his ability to appreciate problems, upon his experience, and upon his ability to interpret that experience. When we impose our adult point of view upon him, when we ask him to take our problem and with the data that we supply ask him to work out our solution, whatever else may be said of the exercise, it may not be called an exercise in reasoning by children.

If we do respect the child’s experience and point of view, the task still remains of making all of the group of children we teach conscious of the aim as their problem. There is no greater test of teaching skill than this. Can the teacher, after having brought to mind the experiences which are relevant to the work she wishes the children to do, make them conscious of a lack in this experience; can she awaken the need for further consideration of past experience and a desire to reconstruct and to amplify it? In proportion as she is able to accomplish this result, we may be sure that children are reasoning upon problems which are vital to them, and that the motive has been provided which will secure the maximum of controlled intellectual activity on their part. The best single test of the accomplishment of this ideal is to require that the statement of aim be made by the children themselves as a result of the guidance we have given. This conception of the meaning and significance of the aim suggests the solution of the difficulty which some people find in harmonizing the idea of instruction with the doctrine of self-activity.

Instruction, when properly conducted, does not impose the ideas, the problems, or the conclusions of adults upon children. Rather we are concerned in instruction with the child’s experience, his tendency to react, his need of adjustment; and our function as teachers is to guide him, to stimulate him to his own best efforts, to insure the maximum of self-activity while we guide this activity toward the accomplishment of ends which are desirable. The difficulty is, of course, that the problem for solution at any given time may not be equally vital to every member of the group. Here is where the element of control enters somewhat in opposition to the self-activity of the individual. But this condition of affairs is necessarily true both in school and out of it, for society sets up for us certain norms or standards of experience which must be realized by all, and we must for the sake of economy handle children in groups. If the problem is not beyond the child’s comprehension, if it deals with situations which are significant to him, if the solution derived has some bearing on his future action, if he has carefully scrutinized his experience in the light of the problem stated and has brought to bear those elements which are significant for its solution, we may be confident that the activity resulting is closely akin to that which is found in the controlled thinking of men the world over.

In order that it may be more easy for children to focus their attention upon the problem in hand, there is considerable advantage in a clear, concise, concrete, and preferably a brief statement of the aim.[7] A problem is half solved when one can state it clearly. So long as the problem is not sufficiently well defined to admit of accurate statement on the part of pupils, there is danger that there may be much wandering in its consideration. One of the great lessons to be taught in work of this sort is the need of examining the ideas as they suggest themselves to see whether or not they are relevant.

The argument as it has been stated above points to the statement of aim as the culmination of the step of preparation. This does not mean that a considerable period must always elapse in the conduct of an exercise of this type before the aim can be stated. There are occasions, and when the teaching has been good they should be frequent, when the lesson should begin with the statement of the problem discovered in a previous lesson and made clear in the assignment of work. In other cases the same aim may hold for several days; i.e. until the problem is solved. In general, as we advance through the grades, the ends for which children work should become relatively more remote, and the achievement of these ends should require a longer period of work. There is an advantage in setting up subsidiary aims which will make steps of progress in the realization of the larger purpose.