I knew certain of them, who, after reasoning about the ceremonies with some of our side, required, in the end, no more but that they would only acknowledge the indifferency of the things in themselves. And so being wooed and solicitously importuned by our former arguments against the ceremonies, they take them to the weaving of Penelope's web, thereby to suspend us, and to gain time against us: this indifferency, I mean, which they shall never make out, and which themselves, otherwhiles, unweave again. Always, so long as they think to get any place for higher notions about the ceremonies, they speak not so meanly of them as of things indifferent; but when all their forces of arguments and answers are spent in vain, then are our ears filled with uncouth outcries and declamations, which tend to make themselves appear blameless for receiving, and us blameworthy for refusing matters of rite and indifferency.
Upon this string they harp over and over [pg 1-379] again, in books, in sermons, in private discourses. Mr G. Powell (in his book De Adiaphoris), and Tilen (in the 12th and 17th chapters of his Paraenesis), condemn those who make aught ado about the controverted English ceremonies, for so much as they are things indifferent. Paybody, in his Apology for kneeling at the communion, standeth much upon the indifferency of this gesture, both in every worship of God, and in that sacrament namely. The Archbishop of St. Andrews, in his sermon at Perth Assembly, because he could not prove this indifferency, he chose to suppose it. “Of the indifferency of these articles (saith he) I think there is little or no question amongst us.” Whether he spake this of ignorance or of policy, I leave it to be guessed at. Howsoever, if we should thus compose our controversy about the ceremonies, embrace them, and practise them, so being that they be only called things indifferent, this were to cure our church, as L. Sylla cured his country, durioribus remediis quam pericula erant, saith Seneca.[1169] Wherefore we will debate this question of indifferency also.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE NATURE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT.
Sect. 1. To say nothing here of the homonymy of the word indifferent, but to take it in that signification which concerneth our present purpose, it signifieth such a mean [pg 1-380] betwixt good and evil in human actions, as is alike distant from both these extremes, and yet susceptive of either of them. Indifferens, saith Calepin, is that quod sua natura neque bonum est neque malum. Aquinas[1170] calleth that an indifferent action which is neither good nor evil. Rem indifferentem voco quae neque bona neque mala in se est, saith a later writer.[1171]
But Dr Forbesse[1172] liketh to speak in another language. He will have that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary; and a thing indifferent he taketh to be such a thing as is neither necessarily to be done, nor yet necessarily to be omitted, in respect of any necessity of the commandment of God; or such a thing as is neither remunerable with eternal life, and commendeth a man unto the reward of God, nor yet is punishable with eternal death, and polluteth a man with guiltiness. Now, because he knew that divines define a thing indifferent to be that which is neither good nor evil, he therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodness of an individual action.[1173] The one he calleth bonitas generalis, concomitans, et sine qua non; by which goodness is meant the doing of an action in faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as he expoundeth himself. This goodness, he saith, is necessary to every human action, and hindereth not an action to be indifferent. The other he calleth bonitas specialis, causans, et propter quam. This goodness he calleth legal, and saith that it maketh an action necessary; in which respect indifferent actions are not good, but those only which God in his law hath commanded, and which are remunerable with eternal life.
Sect. 2. But that we may have the vanity of these quiddities discovered to us, let us only consider how falsely he supposeth that there are some things which we do neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall neither be rewarded (it is his own phrase which I use) nor yet punished by God. I thought we had learned from Scripture that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which we speak, and of every deed which we do in the flesh, and accordingly to receive either a reward or a punishment. [pg 1-381] What! Could the Doctor say that these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor remunerable? Nay, but he saith[1174] that the general goodness which accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary, but the action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself is not remunerable.
Ans. 1. The Doctor had done well to have remembered that he is speaking only of individual actions, and that actus individuatur a circumstantus et adjecto modo, so that whilst all that he saith turneth to this, that one action considered in itself, without the circumstances and concomitant goodness, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point; for he saith no more in effect, but that actus quo ad speciem is not remunerable, which none of us denieth.
2. An individual good action of that kind which the Doctor calleth necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable than an individual good action of that kind which he calleth indifferent, for example, when I go to hear God's word upon the Lord's day, let this action of mine be considered quo ad individuum, is it any otherwise remunerable than in respect of the goodness which accompanieth it? Whence it is that the hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because commanded? Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the remunerable good of this action of hearing, and remunerable good of one of those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, for example, a woman's action of marrying.