I perceive what the Doctor would answer, for he saith,[1175] if a woman marry in the Lord, this action is good respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in se sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum, implying that if, on the other part, an individual action be necessary (as for example the action of hearing the word), then it is in itself good, etiam quo ad individuum.
But, I reply, what means he by these [pg 1-382] words, in se? Means he the individual nature of the action? Nay, then the sense shall be no other than this, quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum. And, besides, the Doctor cannot define to us any other nature in an individual thing than the nature of the species or kind.
Is it not holden individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione specici?[1176] Sure a perfect definition, expressing the nature of the thing defined, cannot be given to any individual thing other than the definition of the species, needs, therefore, must the Doctor, by in se, understand the specifical nature, and, indeed, when divines speak of things indifferent, in se, per se, or sua natura, they mean only things indifferent quo ad speciem. Yet thus also the Doctor hath said nonsense, for so we should take his words, quamvis quoad speciem sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum.
Sect. 3. But to let his manner of speaking pass, we will consider what he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely, because it is both good in itself, or quo ad speciem, and likewise respectu adjecti modi, whereas a woman's action of marrying (when she marrieth in the Lord) is only good and remunerable in the last respect, namely, respectu modi, for, in se, or, quo ad speciem, it hath no remunerable goodness in it.
Ans. What do we hear of any difference betwixt these actions quo ad speciem? That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being considered quo ad individuum.
That whereby the Doctor either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth to be this: That he taketh everything which agreeth to an individual thing to agree to it quo ad individuum, as if to speak of Peter quatenus est homo, and to speak of him quatenus est individuum signatum, or res singularis sub specie hominis, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my individual action of hearing the word, that it is necessary [pg 1-383] because of the commandment of God (and in that respect remunerable), is not to speak of it quo ad individuum, but as the specifical nature of that action of hearing the word (which God hath commanded) is found in it; for if we speak of this individual action, quo ad individuum, we cannot consider it otherwise than respectu adjecti modi, because, in moral actions, modus adjectus is principium individuationis, and nothing else doth individualise a moral action.
Sect. 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth indifferent, because their species is not commanded, both being considered quo ad individuum, the former hath no other remunerable good in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either of them standeth only in objecto modo; which being so, it is all one when we speak of any individual moral action quo ad individuum, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For, as is well said by Aquinas,[1177] Necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere. And again: Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus; wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, causans and concomitans, which the Doctor hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now moral goodness, saith Scalliger,[1178] est perfectio actus cum recta ratione. Human moral actions are called good or evil, in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, saith Aquinas,[1179] thereupon inferring that illis mores dicuntur boni, qui rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui à ratione discordant. Dr Forbesse doth therefore pervert the question whilst he saith,[1180] in hac cum fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium. Nay, those actions we call morally good which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be necessary or not. Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable which [pg 1-384] are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are, therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, and so not indifferent. Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being considered quo ad individuum, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner quo ad individuum, as hath been showed.
Sect. 5. And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say of the Doctor's speculation about the nature of things indifferent.
For, 1. The Doctor maketh that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary, and yet he maketh both these to be morally good. Now albeit in natural things one good is opponed to another good, as that which is hot to that which is cold, yet bonum bona non contrariatur in moralibus.[1181] The reason of the difference is, because bonitas physica, or relativa est congruentia naturae quaedem, saith Scalliger;[1182] and because two natures may be contrary one to another, therefore the good which is congruous to the one may be contrary to the good which is congruous to the other; but bonum virtutis, saith Aquinas[1183] non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum, scilicet rationem; so that it is impossible for one moral good to be opponed to another.
2. Since divines take a thing indifferent to be medium inter bonum et malum morale; and since (as the very notation of the word showeth) it is such a means as cometh not nearer to the one extreme than to the other, but is alike distant from both, how comes it that the Doctor so far departeth both from the tenet of divines and from the notation of the word, as to call some such actions indifferent as have a moral remunerable goodness, and yet not evil in them? or where learned he such a dialect as giveth to some good things the name of the things indifferent?