3. Whilst he is discoursing of the church's power to prescribe things pertaining to order, contra-distinguished from her power which she hath to publish the commandments of Christ, he reckons forth among his other examples, women's silence in the church, as if the church did prescribe this as a matter of order left to her determination, and not publish it as the commandment of Christ in his word.
4. Whereas he saith that the church hath power to prescribe such rites and ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, [pg 1-256] and regard of, the works of God's service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion, by his own words shall he be condemned: for a little before he reprehendeth the Romanists for maintaining that the church hath power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects. And a little after he saith, that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify, assure, and convey unto men such benefits of saving grace as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to cause a regard of, and a respect unto the works of God's service, and thereby to stir up men to fervour and devotion, what is it but the working of a spiritual and supernatural effect, and the conveying unto men such a benefit of saving grace as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them? In like manner, whereas he holdeth that the church hath power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to express those spiritual and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, which are or should be in men, in the very same place he confuteth himself, whilst he affirmeth that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify unto men those benefits of saving grace which God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to express such heavenly and spiritual affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, as should be in men, is (I suppose) to signify unto men such benefits of saving grace, as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Who dare deny it?
Sect. 2. Bishop Lindsey's opinion touching the power of the church,[879] whereof we dispute, is, that power is given unto her to “determine the circumstances which are in the general necessary to be used in divine worship, but not defined particularly in the word.”
I know the church can determine nothing which is not of this kind and quality. But the Prelate's meaning (as may be seen in that same epistle of his) is, that whatsoever the church determineth, if it be such a circumstance as is in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, then we cannot say that the church had no power to determine and enjoin the same, nor be led by the judgment of our own consciences, judging it not expedient, but that in this [pg 1-257] case we must take the church's law to be the rule of our consciences. Now, by this ground which the Prelate holdeth, the church may prescribe to the ministers of the gospel the whole habit and apparel of the Levitical high-priest (which were to Judaize). For apparel is a circumstance in the general necessary, yet it is not particularly defined in the word. By this ground, the church may determine that I should ever pray with my face to the east, preach kneeling on my knees, sing the psalms lying on my back, and hear sermons standing only upon one foot. For in all these actions a gesture is necessary; but there is no gesture particularly defined in the word to which we are adstricted in any of these exercises.
And further, because uno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur, by this ground the Prelate must say, that the church hath power to ordain three or four holidays every week (which ordinance, as he himself hath told us, could not stand with charity, the inseparable companion of piety), for time is a circumstance in the general necessary in divine worship, yet in his judgment we are not bound by the word to any particular time for the performance of the duties of God's worship.
By this ground we were to say, that Pope Innocent III. held him within the bounds of ecclesiastical power, when in the great Lateran council, anno 1215, he made a decree, that all the faithful of both sexes should once in the year at least, to wit, upon Easter-day, receive the sacrament of the eucharist. From whence it hath come to pass, that the common people in the church of Rome receive the sacrament only upon Easter. Now, the time of receiving the sacrament is a circumstance in the general necessary, for a time it must have, but it is not particularly defined in the word. It is left indefinite, 1 Cor. xi. 26, yet the church hath no power to determine Easter-day, either as the only time, or as the fittest time, for all the faithful of both sexes to receive the eucharist. What if faithful men and women cannot have time to prepare themselves as becometh, being avocated and distracted by the no less necessary than honest adoes of their particular callings?
What if they cannot have the sacrament upon that day administered according to our Lord's institution? What if they see Papists confirming themselves in their Easter superstition by our unnecessary practice? Shall [pg 1-258] they swallow these and such-like soul-destroying camels, and all for straining out the gnat of communicating precisely upon Easter-day? But since time is a necessary circumstance, and no time is particularly defined, the Bishop must say more also, that the church may determine Easter-day for the only day whereupon we may receive the Lord's supper.
Last of all, if the church have power to determine all circumstances in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, what could be said against that ancient order of solemn baptizing only at the holidays of Easter and Pentecost (whereby it came to pass that very many died unbaptized, as Socrates writeth[880])? Or, what shall be said against Tertullian's opinion,[881] which alloweth lay men, yea, women, to baptize. May the church's determination make all this good, forasmuch as these circumstances of the time when, and the persons by whom, baptism should be ministered, are in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word? Ite leves nugae.
Sect. 3. Camero,[882] as learned a Formalist as any of the former, expresseth his judgment copiously touching our present question. He saith, that there are two sorts of things which the church commandeth, to wit, either such as belong to faith and manners, or such as conduce to faith and manners; that both are in God's word prescribed exserte, plainly, but not one way, because such things that pertain unto faith and manners, are in the word of God particularly commanded, whereas those things which conduce to faith and manners are but generally commended unto us. Of things that pertain to faith and manners, he saith, that they are most constant and certain, and such as can admit no change; but as for things conducing to faith and manners, he saith, that they depend upon the circumstances of persons, place, and time, which being almost infinite, there could not be particular precepts delivered unto us concerning such things. Only this is from God commended unto the church, that whatsoever is done publicly be done with order, and what privately be decent.
These things he so applieth to his purpose, that he determineth, in neither of these [pg 1-259] kinds the church hath power to make laws, because in things pertaining to faith and manners the law of our Lord Jesus Christ is plainly expressed; and in those things, wherein neither faith nor manners are placed, but which conduce to faith and manners, we have indeed a general law, not having further any particular law, for that reason alleged, namely, because this depends upon the circumstances.