Thereafter he addeth, Quid sit fides, quid sit pietas, quid sit charitas, verbo Dei demonstratur. Quid ad hæc conducat, seu reputando rem in universum, seu reputando rem quatenus singulis competit, pendet ex cognitione circumstantiarum. Jam id definire Deus voluit esse penes ecclesiam, hae tamen lege, ut quod definit ecclesia, conveniat generali definitioni Dei.
The matter he illustrates with this one example: God's word doth define in the general that we are to fast, and that publicly; but, in the particular, we could not have the definition of the word, because there are infinite occasions of a public fast, as it is said in the schools, individua esse infinita; so that it is the church's part to look to the occasion, and this depends upon the consideration of the circumstances. This discourse of his cannot satisfy the attentive reader, but deserveth certain animadversions.
Sect. 4. First, then, it is to be observed how he is drawn into a manifest contradiction; for whereas he saith, that God's word doth exserte and diserte commend unto us generatim, such things as conduce to faith and manners, and that concerning things of this nature we have a general law in Scripture, how can this stand with that which he addeth, namely, that it is in the church's power to define what things conduce to faith, piety, and charity, even reputando rem in universum?
2. Whereas he saith that the church hath no power to make laws, neither in things belonging to faith and manners, nor in things conducing to the same; I would also see how this agreeth with that other position, namely, that it is in the power of the church to define what things do conduce to faith, piety and charity.
3. What means he by his application of order to public, and decency to private actions, as if the Apostle did not require both these in the public words of God's service performed in the church?
4. Whereas he saith that such things as conduce to faith and manners do depend upon the circumstances, and so could not be particularly defined in the word, either he speaks of those things as they are defined in the general, or as they are defined in the particular. Not the first; for as they are defined in the general, they cannot depend upon changeable circumstances, and that because, according to his own tenet, the word defines them in the general, and this definition of the word is most certain and constant, neither can any change happen unto it. Wherefore (without doubt) he must pronounce this of the definition of such things in the particular. Now, to say that things conducing to faith and manners, as they are particularly defined, do depend upon circumstances, is as much as to say that circumstances depend upon circumstances. For things conducing to faith and manners, which the church hath power to determine particularly, what are they other than circumstances? Surely he who taketh not Camero's judgment to be, that the church hath power to determine somewhat more than the circumstances (and by consequence a part of the substance) of God's worship, shall give no sense to his words. Yet, if one would take his meaning so, I see not how he can be saved from contradicting himself; forasmuch as he holdeth that such things as pertain to faith and manners are particularly defined in the word. To say no more, I smell such things in Camero's opinion as can neither stand with reason nor with himself.
5. God's word doth not only define things pertaining to faith and manners, but also things conducing to the same, and that not only generally, but in some respects, and sometimes, particularly. And we take for example his own instance of fasting. For the Scripture defineth very many occasions of fasting; Ezra viii. 21; 2 Chron. xx.; Jonah iii.; Joel ii.; Acts xiii. 3; Josh. vii. 6; Judg. xx. 16; Esth. iv. 16; Ezra ix. x.; Zech. vii. From which places we gather that the Scripture defineth fasting to be used,
1. For supplication, when we want some necessary or expedient good thing.
2. For deprecation, when we fear some evil.
3. For humiliation, when, by our sins, we have provoked God's wrath. Neither can there be any occasion of fasting whereof I may not say that either it is particularly [pg 1-261] designed in Scripture, or else that it may be by necessary consequence defined out of Scripture; or, lastly, that it is of that sort of things which were not determinable by Scripture, because circumstances are infinite, as Camero hath told us.