Where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to the antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the consequents; and, according as these exhibit most of good or least of evil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which they respectively belong.[132] The larger lot of good things is preferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if cast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to another thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is not per se good, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice and courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with the absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or along with pain.[133] Everything is better, at the season when it tells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than in youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required, and therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is useful only now and then; e.g., justice and moderation, as compared with courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other would not be required; e.g., justice is better than courage, for, if every one were just, courage would not be required.[134]
[132] Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.
[133] Ibid. a. 16-25.
[134] Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.
Among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation or acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or the loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to the Summum Bonum or to that which is better than itself (unless indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of a caricature, as the ape is to man[135]); that which is the more conspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and peculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that which we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our friends, rather than to ordinary strangers (e.g., doing justice or conferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we prefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer seeming to do so[136]); that which we cannot obtain from others, as compared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally desirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have something else along with it; that of which the absence is a ground of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;[137] that which does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the proprietor (to his mind rather than his body);[138] that which is eligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that which is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.[139] Acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are sometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life simply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes necessaries are more eligible, as, e.g., to a starving man. Speaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are better.[140]
[135] Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα εἴη ὅμοιον, καθάπερ ὁ πίθηκος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῦ ἵππου μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίου· οὐ γὰρ κάλλιον ὁ πίθηκος, ὁμοιότερον δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
[136] Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. ἃ πρὸς τὸν φίλον πρᾶξαι μᾶλλον βουλόμεθα ἢ ἃ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα, ταῦτα αἱρετώτερα, οἷον τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ δοκεῖν· τοὺς γὰρ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν βουλόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ τυχόντας ἀνάπαλιν.
[137] Topic. III. ii. p. 118, a. 16-26.
[138] Ibid. iii. p. 118, a. 29.
[139] Ibid. b. 20. The definition of this last condition is — that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that we possessed it: ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, τὸ μηδενὸς συνειδότος μὴ ἂν σπουδάσαι ὑπάρχειν.