[85] Ibid. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16. Compare Topica, I. ii. p. 101, a. 30, seq.
[86] Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 9: δεύτερον δὲ πρὸς τὰς καθ’ αὑτὸν ζητήσεις (χρήσιμοι)· ὁ γὰρ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου ῥᾳδιως παραλογιζόμενος καὶ τοῦτο μὴ αἰσθανόμενος κἂν αὐτὸς ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ τοῦτο πάθοι πολλάκις.
[87] Ibid. a. 20: οὐ ταὐτὸ δ’ ἐστὶ λαβόντα τε τὸν λόγον ἰδεῖν καὶ λῦσαι τὴν μοχθηρίαν, καὶ ἐρωτώμενον ἀπαντᾶν δύνασθαι ταχέως. ὃ γὰρ ἴσμεν, πολλάκις μετατιθέμενον ἀγνοοῦμεν. Compare xxxiii. p. 182, b. 7.
[88] Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 25: ὥστε, ἂν δῆλον μὲν ἡμῖν ᾖ, ἀμελέτητοι δ’ ὦμεν, ὑστεροῦμεν τῶν καιρῶν πολλάκις.
Accordingly the Sophistici Elenchi contains precepts, at considerable length,[89] to the respondent in a sophistical debate, how reply or solution is to be given to the fallacies involved in the questions; all the thirteen Fallacies, (the six In Dictione, and the seven Extra Dictionem) being treated in succession. In conducting his defensive procedure, the respondent must keep constantly in mind what the Sophistical Refutation really is. He must treat it not as a real or genuine refutation, but as a mere simulation of such; and he must so arrange his reply as to bring into full evidence this fact of simulation. What he has to guard against is, not the being really refuted but, the seeming to be refuted.[90] The refutative syllogism constructed by the sophistical questioner, including as it does Equivocation, Amphiboly, or some other verbal fallacy, and therefore yielding no valid conclusion, does not settle whether the respondent is really refuted or not. If indeed the questioner, in putting his interrogation, discriminates the double meaning of his words, where they have a double meaning, the respondent ought to answer plainly and briefly Yes, or No; either affirming or denying what is tendered. But, if the questioner does not so discriminate, the respondent cannot reply simply Yes, or No: he must himself discriminate the two meanings, and affirm or deny accordingly.[91] Unless he guards himself by such discrimination, he cannot avoid falling into a contradiction, at least in appearance. The equivocal wording of the question will be tantamount to the fallacy of putting two questions as one.[92]
[89] From xvi. p. 175, to xxxiii. p. 183, of Soph. El.
[90] Soph. El. xvii. p. 175, a. 33: ὅλως γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς μαχετέον, οὐκ ὡς ἐλέγχοντας, ἀλλ’ ὡς φαινομένους· οὐ γάρ φαμεν συλλογίζεσθαί γε αὐτούς, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν διορθωτέον.
[91] Ibid. b. 1-14. Compare Topica, VIII. vii. p. 160, a. 29.
Aristotle tells us that this demand for a reply brief and direct, without any qualifying additions or distinctions, was advanced by dialecticians in former days much more emphatically than in his own — ὅ τ’ ἐπιζητοῦσι νῦν μὲν ἧττον πρότερον δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐριστικοί, τὸ ἢ ναὶ ἢ οὒ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, ἐγίνετ’ ἄν. I presume that he makes comparison with the Platonic dialogues — Euthydemus, p. 295; Gorgias, pp. 448-449; Protagoras, pp. 334-335.
[92] Soph. El. xvii. 175, b. 15-p. 176, a. 18.