As the questioner may propound as refutation what seems to be such but is not so in reality, so the respondent may meet it by what is an apparent solution but no solution in reality, There occur various cases, in sophistic or agonistic debate, wherein a simulated solution of this kind is even preferable to a real one.[93] If the question is plausible, the respondent may answer, “Be it so�; but, if it involves any paradox in answering, he will answer by saying, “So it would appear�: he will thus not be supposed to have granted what amounts to refutation or paradox.[94] Where the question put is such that, while involving falsehood or paradox if answered in the affirmative, it is at the same time closely or immediately connected with the thesis set up, — the respondent may treat it as equivalent to a Petitio Principii, and make answer in the negative. Also, where the questioner, trying to establish an universal proposition by Induction, puts the final question, not under an universal term but, as the general result of the particulars conceded (and such like), — the respondent may refuse to admit this last step, and may say that his antecedent concessions have been misunderstood.[95]
[93] Ibid. p. 176, a. 21.
[94] Ibid. a. 25.
[95] Ibid. a. 27-35.
If a question is put in plain and appropriate language, answer must be made plainly or with some clear distinction; but, where the question is put obscurely and elliptically, leaving part of the meaning unexpressed, the respondent must not concede it unreservedly. If he does, fallacious refutation may very possibly be the result:[96] he may appear to be refuted by that which is no real refutation. If, of two propositions, the second follows upon the first, but the first does not follow upon the second, the respondent, where he has the choice, ought to grant the second only, and not the first. He ought not to make a greater concession when he can escape with a less;[97] e.g., he ought to concede the particular rather than the universal.
[96] Ibid. a. 38-b. 7.
[97] Ibid. b. 8-13.
Again, among opinions generally received, there are some which the public recognize as matters of more or less doubt and uncertainty; others, on which they are firmly assured that every one who contradicts them speaks falsely. When it is uncertain to which of these two classes the question put is referable, the respondent will be safer in answering neither affirmatively nor negatively, but simply, “I go with the received opinions.�[98] In cases where opinions are divided, he may find opportunity for changing the terms, and for substituting a metaphorical equivalent as what he concedes. Such change of terms may pass without protest, in consequence of the doubtful character of the matter; while it will embarrass the questioner in constructing his refutation.[99] The respondent may further embarrass him by anticipating questions that seem likely to be put, and by objecting against them beforehand.[100]
[98] Soph. El. xvii. p. 176, b. 14-20.
Both the text and the meaning of this difficult clause are differently given by various commentators. The text and construction of Waitz appears to me the best, and I have followed him. I cannot agree with Mr. Poste when he declares (notes, p. 143) ἀποφάνεις to be the true reading, instead of ἀποφάσεις, which last is adopted both by Bekker and in the edition of Firmin Didot.