[31] Ibid. II. p. 413, b. 11: ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχή. — Ibid. I. p. 412, a. 5: τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς.
[32] Aristot. De Animâ, II. i. p. 412, b. 7: τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα.
This distinction of Form and Matter is one of the capital features of Aristotle’s Philosophia Prima. He expands it and diversifies it in a thousand ways, often with subtleties very difficult to follow; but the fundamental import of it is seldom lost — two correlates inseparably implicated in fact and reality in every concrete individual that has received a substantive name, yet logically separable and capable of being named and considered apart from each other. The Aristotelian analysis thus brings out, in regard to each individual substance (or Hoc Aliquid, to use his phrase), a triple point of view: (1) The Form; (2) The Matter; (3) The compound or aggregate of the two — in other words, the inseparable Ens, which carries us out of the domain of logic or abstraction into that of the concrete or reality.[33]
[33] Aristot. Metaphys. Z. iii. p. 1029, a. 1-34; De Animâ, II. i. p. 412, a. 6; p. 414, a. 15.
In the first book of the Physica, Aristotle pushes this analysis yet further, introducing three principia instead of two:—(1 ) Form, (2) Matter, (3) Privation (of Form); he gives a distinct general name to the negation as well as to the affirmation; he provides a sign minus as counter-denomination to the sign plus. But he intimates that this is only the same analysis more minutely discriminated, or in a different point of view: διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δύο λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἔστι δ’ ὡς τρεῖς (Phys. I. vii. p. 190, b. 29).
Materia Prima (Aristotle says, Phys. I. vii. p. 191, a. 8) is “knowable only by analogy� — i.e., explicable only by illustrative examples: as the brass is to the statue, as the wood is to the couch, &c.; natural substances being explained from works of art, as is frequent with Aristotle.
Aristotle farther recognizes, between these two logical correlates, a marked difference of rank. The Form stands first, the Matter second, — not in time, but in notional presentation. The Form is higher, grander, prior in dignity and esteem, more Ens, or more nearly approaching to perfect entity; the Matter is lower, meaner, posterior in dignity, farther removed from that perfection. The conception of wax, plaster, wood, &c., without amy definite or determinate shape, is confused and unimpressive; but a name, connoting some definite shape, at once removes this confusion, and carries with it mental pre-eminence, alike as to phantasy, memory, and science. In the logical hierarchy of Aristotle, Matter is the inferior and Form the superior;[34] yet neither of the two can escape from its relative character: Form requires Matter for its correlate, and is nothing in itself or apart,[35] just as much as Matter requires Form; though from the inferior dignity of Matter we find it more frequently described as the second or correlate, while Form is made to stand forward as the relatum. For complete reality, we want the concrete individual having the implication of both; while, in regard to each of the constituents per se, no separate real existence can be affirmed, but only a nominal or logical separation.
[34] Aristot. De Gener. Animal. II. i. p. 729, a. 10. Matter and Form are here compared to the female and the male — to mother and father. Form is a cause operative, Matter a cause co-operative, though both are alike indispensable to full reality. Compare Physic. I. ix. p. 192, a. 13: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γινομένων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ· — ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θῆλυ ἄῤῥενος καὶ αἰσχρὸν καλοῦ (ἐφίετο). — De Partibus Animalium, I. i. p. 640, b. 28: ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως.
Metaphys. Z. iii. p. 1029, a. 5: τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης πρότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ὄν — p. 1039, a. 1.
See in Schwegler, pp. 13, 42, 83, Part II. of his Commentary on the Aristotelian Metaphysica.