[35] Aristot. Metaph. Z. viii. p. 1033, b. 10, seq.
This difference of rank between Matter and Form — that the first is inferior and the last the superior — is sometimes so much put in the foreground, that the two are conceived in a different manner and under other names, as Potential and Actual. Matter is the potential, imperfect, inchoate, which the supervening Form actualizes into the perfect and complete; a transition from half-reality to entire reality or act. The Potential is the undefined or indeterminate[36] — what may be or may not be — what is not yet actual, and may perhaps never become so, but is prepared to pass into actuality when the energizing principle comes to aid. In this way of putting the antithesis, the Potential is not so much implicated with the Actual as merged and suppressed to make room for the Actual: it is as a half-grown passing into a full-grown; being itself essential as a preliminary stage in the order of logical generation.[37] The three logical divisions — Matter, Form, and the resulting Compound or Concrete (τὸ σύνολον, τὸ συνειλημμένον), are here compressed into two — the Potential and the Actualization thereof. Actuality (ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια) coincides in meaning partly with the Form, partly with the resulting Compound; the Form being so much exalted, that the distinction between the two is almost effaced.[38]
[36] Ibid. Θ. viii. p. 1050, b. 10. He says, p. 1048, a. 35, that this distinction between Potential and Actual cannot be defined, but can only be illustrated by particular examples, several of which he proceeds to enumerate. Trendelenburg observes (Note ad. Aristot. De Animâ, p. 307):—“Δύναμις contraria adhuc in se inclusa tenet, ut in utrumque abire possit: ἐνέργεια alterum excludit.â€� Compare also ib. p. 302. This May or May not be is the widest and most general sense of the terms δύναμις and δυνατόν, common to all the analogical or derivative applications that Aristotle points out as belonging to them. It is more general than that which he gives as the κύριος ὅρος τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως — ἀρχή μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο, and ought seemingly to be itself considered as the κύριος ὅρος. Cf. Arist. Metaphys. Δ. xii. p. 1020, a. 5, with the comment of Bonitz, who remarks upon the loose language of Aristotle in this chapter but imputes to Aristotle a greater amount of contradiction than he seems to deserve (Comm. ad Metaphys. pp. 256, 393).
[37] Ens potentiâ is a variety of Ens (Arist. Metaph. Δ. vii. p. 1017, b. 6), but an imperfect variety: it is ὂν ἀτελές, which may become matured into ὂν τέλειον, ὂν ἐντελεχείᾳ or ἐνεργείᾳ (Metaphys. Θ. i. p. 1045, a. 34).
Matter is either remote or proximate, removed either by one stage or several stages from the σύνολον in which it culminates. Strictly speaking, none but proximate matter is said to exist δυνάμει. Alexander Schol. (ad Metaph. Θ. p. 1049, a. 19) p. 781, b. 39: ἡ πόῤῥω ὕλη οὐ λέγεται δυνάμει. τί δή ποτε; ὅτι οὐ παρωνυμιάζομεν τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τῆς πόῤῥω ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς προσεχοῦς· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ κιβώτιον ξύλινον ἐκ τῆς προσεχοῦς, ἀλλ’ οὐ γήϊνον ἐκ τῆς πόῤῥω.
[38] Aristot. Metaphys. Η. i. p. 1042, a. 25, seq. He scarcely makes any distinction here between ὕλη and δύναμις, or between μορφὴ and ἐνέργεια (cf. Θ. viii. p. 1050, a. 15).
Alexander in his Commentary on this book (Θ. iii. p. 1047, a. 30) p. 542, Bonitz’s edit., remarks that ἐνέργεια is used by Aristotle in a double sense; sometimes meaning κίνησις πρὸς τὸ τέλος, sometimes meaning the τέλος itself. Comp. Η. iii. p. 1043, a. 32; also the commentary of Bonitz, p. 393.
Two things are to be remembered respecting Matter, in its Aristotelian (logical or ontological) sense: (1) It may be Body, but it is not necessarily Body;[39] (2) It is only intelligible as the correlate of Form: it can neither exist by itself, nor can it be known by itself (i.e., when taken out of that relativity). This deserves notice, because to forget the relativity of a relative word, and to reason upon it as if it were an absolute, is an oversight not unfrequent. Furthermore, each variety of Matter has its appropriate Form, and each variety of Form its appropriate Matter, with which it correlates. There are various stages or gradations of Matter; from Materia Prima, which has no Form at all, passing upwards through successive partial developments to Materia Ultima; which last is hardly[40] distinguishable from Form or from Materia Formata.
[39] Aristot. Metaph. Z. xi. p. 1036, a. 8: ἡ δ’ ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ’ αὑτήν. ὕλη δ’ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή, ἡ δὲ νοητή· αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά. — p. 1035, a. 7.
Physica, III. vi. p. 207, a. 26; De Generat. et Corrupt. I. v. p. 320, b. 14-25.