[416] Thucyd. iii, 40. πειθόμενοι δὲ ἐμοὶ τά τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε· ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς μὲν οὐ χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε.
[417] Thucyd. iii. 48: compare the speech of Kleon. iii, 40. ὑμεῖς δὲ γνόντες ἀμείνω τάδε εἶναι, καὶ μήτε οἴκτῳ πλέον νείμαντες μήτε ἐπιεικείᾳ, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐῶ προσάγεσθαι, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παραινουμένων, etc.
Dr. Arnold distinguishes οἶκτος (or ἔλεος) from ἐπιεικεία, by saying that “the former is a feeling, the latter a habit: οἶκτος, pity or compassion, may occasionally touch those who are generally very far from being ἐπιεικεῖς—mild or gentle. Ἐπιεικεία relates to all persons,—οἶκτος, to particular individuals.” The distinction here taken is certainly in itself just, and ἐπιεικὴς sometimes has the meaning ascribed to it by Dr. Arnold: but in this passage I believe it has a different meaning. The contrast between οἶκτος and ἐπιεικεία—as Dr. Arnold explains them—would be too feeble, and too little marked, to serve the purpose of Kleon and Diodotus. Ἐπιεικεία here rather means the disposition to stop short of your full rights; a spirit of fairness and adjustment; an abatement on your part likely to be requited by abatement on the part of your adversary: compare Thucyd. i, 76; iv, 19; v, 86; viii, 93.
[418] Thucyd. iii, 44. ἐγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσων· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας ... δικαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ (Κλέωνος) ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἐς Μυτιληναίους, τάχα ἂν ἐπισπάσαιτο· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἕξουσιν.
So Mr. Burke, in his speech on Conciliation with America (Burke’s Works, vol. iii. pp. 69-74), in discussing the proposition of prosecuting the acts of the refractory colonies as criminal: “The thing seems a great deal too big for my ideas of jurisprudence. It should seem, to my way of conceiving such matters, that there is a wide difference in reason and policy, between the mode of proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals, or even of bands of men who disturb order within the state,—and the civil dissensions which may from time to time agitate the several communities which compose a great empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic, to apply the ordinary ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people,” etc.—“My consideration is narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question.”
[419] Thucyd. iii, 42.
[420] Thucyd. iii, 43.
[421] Thucyd. iii, 45, 46.
[422] Compare this speech of Diodotus with the views of punishment implied by Xenophon in his Anabasis, where he is describing the government of Cyrus the younger:—
“Nor can any man contend, that Cyrus suffered criminals and wrong-doers to laugh at him: he punished them with the most unmeasured severity (ἀφειδέστατα πάντων ἐτιμωρεῖτο). And you might often see along the frequented roads men deprived of their eyes, their hands, and their feet: so that in his government either Greek or barbarian, if he had no criminal purpose, might go fearlessly through and carry whatever he found convenient.” (Anabasis, i, 9, 13.)