[475] The Orat. xviii, of Isokratês, Paragraphê cont. Kallimachum, informs us on these points, especially sections 1-4.
Kallimachus had entered an action against the client of Isokratês for ten thousand drachmæ (sects. 15-17), charging him as an accomplice of Patroklês,—the king-archon under the Ten, who immediately succeeded the Thirty, prior to the return of the exiles,—in seizing and confiscating a sum of money belonging to Kallimachus. The latter, in commencing this action, was under the necessity of paying the fees called prytaneia; a sum proportional to what was claimed, and amounting to thirty drachmæ, when the sum claimed was between one thousand and ten thousand drachmæ. Suppose that action had gone to trial directly, Kallimachus, if he lost his cause, would have to forfeit his prytaneia, but he would forfeit no more. Now according to the paragraphê permitted by the law of Archinus, the defendant is allowed to make oath that the action against him is founded upon a fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidês; and a cause is then tried first, upon that special issue, upon which the defendant is allowed to speak first, before the plaintiff. If the verdict, on this special issue, is given in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff is not only disabled from proceeding further with his action, but is condemned besides to pay to the defendant the forfeit called epobely: that is, one-sixth part of the sum claimed. But if, on the contrary, the verdict on the special issue be in favor of the plaintiff, he is held entitled to proceed farther with his original action, and to receive besides at once, from the defendant, the like forfeit or epobely. Information on these regulations of procedure in the Attic dikasteries may be found in Meier and Schömann, Attischer Prozess, p. 647; Platner, Prozess und Klagen, vol. i, pp. 156-162.
[476] Wachsmuth—who admits into his work, with little or no criticism, everything which has ever been said against the Athenian people, and indeed against the Greeks generally—affirms, contrary to all evidence and probability, that the amnesty was not really observed at Athens. (Wachsm. Hellen. Alterth. ch. ix. sect. 71, vol. ii, p. 267.)
The simple and distinct words of Xenophon, coming as they do from the mouth of so very hostile a witness, are sufficient to refute him: καὶ ὀμόσαντες ὅρκους ἦ μὴν μὴ μνησικακήσειν, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ γε πολιτεύονται, καὶ τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος, (Hellen. ii, 4, 43).
The passages to which Wachsmuth makes reference, do not in the least establish his point. Even if actions at law or accusations had been brought, in violation of the amnesty, this would not prove that the people violated it; unless we also knew that the dikastery had affirmed those actions. But he does not refer to any actions or accusations preferred on any such ground. He only notices some cases in which, accusation being preferred on grounds subsequent to Eukleidês, the accuser makes allusion in his speech to other matters anterior to Eukleidês. Now every speaker before the Athenian dikastery thinks himself entitled to call up before the dikasts the whole past life of his opponent, in the way of analogous evidence going to attest the general character of the latter, good or bad. For example, the accuser of Sokratês mentions, as a point going to impeach the general character of Sokratês, that he had been the teacher of Kritias; while the philosopher, in his defence, alludes to his own resolution and virtue as prytanis in the assembly by which the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ. Both these allusions come out as evidences to general character.
[477] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 9.
[478] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1. ἦγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων (οἱ τριάκοντα) ἵν᾽ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τούτων ἀγροὺς ἔχοιεν.
[479] Isokratês cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, sect. 30.
Θρασύβουλος μὲν καὶ Ἄνυτος, μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων, εἰδότες δὲ τοὺς ἀπογράψαντας, ὅμως οὐ τολμῶσιν αὐτοῖς δίκας λαγχάνειν οὐδὲ μνησικακεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἑτέρων δύνανται διαπράττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν περί γε τῶν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἶσον ἔχειν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀξιοῦσιν.
On the other hand, the young Alkibiadês (in the Orat. xvi, of Isokratês, De Bigis, sect. 56) is made to talk about others recovering their property: τῶν ἄλλων κομιζομένων τὰς οὐσίας. My statement in the text reconciles these two. The young Alkibiadês goes on to state that the people had passed a vote to grant compensation to him for the confiscation of his father’s property, but that the power of his enemies had disappointed him of it. We may well doubt whether such vote ever really passed.