c. 8, p. 48 A. Οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον ὅ, τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ’ ὃ, τι ὁ ἐπαΐων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἶς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια.
[5] Plato, Krito. c. 7-8, pp. 47-48.
Sokrates thus proceeds:—
The point to be decided, therefore, with reference to your proposition, Kriton, is, not what will be generally said if I decline, but whether it will be just or unjust — right or wrong — if I comply; that is, if I consent to escape from prison against the will of the Athenians and against the sentence of law.
Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the question with Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? Never in any case to act unjustly.
To decide the point, I assume this principle, which we have often before agreed upon in our reasonings, and which must stand unshaken now.[6]
We ought not in any case whatever to act wrong or unjustly. To act so is in every case both bad for the agent and dishonourable to the agent, whatever may be its consequences. Even though others act wrong to us, we ought not to act wrong to them in return. Even though others do evil to us, we ought not to do evil to them in return.[7]
[6] Plato, Krito. c. 9, p. 48 E. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, &c.
[7] Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 B. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν, &c.
Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and that most persons hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point is cardinal.