[41] Plato, Phædon, 73-74.
It is declared differently, and more clearly, by Aristotle in the treatise Περὶ Μνήμης καὶ Ἀναμνήσεως, pp. 451-452.
[42] Plato, Lysis, 220 B. ὅσα γάρ φαμεν φίλα εἶναι ἡμῖν ἕνεκα φίλου τινός, ἑτέρῳ ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ λεγόμεναι φιλίαι τελευτῶσιν.
[43] There is no stronger illustration of this than the love of money, which is the very example that Plato himself here cites.
The important point to which I here call attention, in respect to the law of Mental Association, is forcibly illustrated by Mr. James Mill in his ‘Analysis of the Human Mind,’ chapters xxi. and xxii., and by Professor Bain in his works on the Senses and the Intellect, — Intellect, chap. i. sect. 47-48, p. 404 seq. ed. 3; and on the Emotions and the Will, chap. iv. sect. 4-5, p. 428 seq. (3rd ed. p. 363 seq.).
Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion.
The primum amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, is described in restricted terms, as valuable merely to correct evil, and as having no value per se, if evil were assumed not to exist. In consequence chiefly of this restriction, Sokrates discards it as unsatisfactory. Such restriction, however, is noway essential to the doctrine: which approaches to, but is not coincident with, the Ideal Good or Idea of Good, described in other dialogues as what every one yearns after and aspires to, though without ever attaining it and without even knowing what it is.[44] The Platonic Idea was conceived as a substantive, intelligible, Ens, distinct in its nature from all the particulars bearing the same name, and separated from them all by a gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther — yet communicating itself to, or partaken by, all of them, in some inexplicable way. Aristotle combated this doctrine, denying the separate reality of the Idea, and admitting only a common generic essence, dwelling in and pervading the particulars, but pervading them all equally. The general word connoting this generic unity was said by Aristotle (retaining the Platonic phraseology) to be λεγόμενον κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν or καθ’ ἕν.
[44] Plato, Republ. vi. pp. 505-506.
But apart from and beyond such generic unity, which implied a common essence belonging to all, Aristotle recognised a looser, more imperfect, yet more extensive, communion, founded upon common relationship towards some Ἀρχὴ — First Principle or First Object. Such relationship was not always the same in kind: it might be either resemblance, concomitance, antecedence or consequence, &c.: it might also be different in degree, closer or more remote, direct or indirect. Here, then, there was room for graduation, or ordination of objects as former and latter, first, second, third, &c., according as, when compared with each other, they were more or less related to the common root. This imperfect communion was designated by Aristotle under the title κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, as contrasted with κατὰ γένος: the predicate which affirmed it was said to be applied, not κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν or καθ’ ἕν, but πρὸς μίαν φύσιν or πρὸς ἕν:[45] it was affirmed neither entirely συνωνύμως (which would imply generic communion), nor entirely ὁμωνύμως (which would be casual and imply no communion at all), but midway between the two, so as to admit of a graduated communion, and an arrangement as former and later, first cousin, or second, third cousin. Members of the same Genus were considered to be brothers, all on a par: but wherever there was this graduated cousinship or communion (signified by the words Former and Later, more or less in degree of relationship), Aristotle did not admit a common Genus, nor did Plato admit a Substantive Idea.[46]
[45] Arist. Metaphys. A. 1072, a. 26-29; Bonitz, Comm. p. 497 id. Πρῶτον ὀρεκτόν — Πρῶτον vοητόν (πρῶτον ὀρεκτὸν — “quod per se appetibile est et concupiscitur”). “Quod autem primum est in aliquâ serie, id præcipue etiam habet qualitatem, quæ in reliquâ cernitur serie, c. a. 993, b. 24: ergo prima illa substantia est τὸ ἄριστον” — also Γ. 1004, a. 25-26, 1005, a. 7, about the πρῶτον ἕν — πρῶτον ὄν. These were τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα — τὰ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα — which were something less than συνώνυμα and more than ὁμώνυμα; intermediate between the two, having no common λόγος or generical unity, and yet not entirely equivocal, but designating a κοινὸν κατ’ ἀναλογίαν: not κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν λεγόμενα, but πρὸς ἓν or πρὸς μίαν φύσιν; having a certain relation to one common φύσις called τὸ πρῶτον. See the Metaphys. Γ. 1003, a. 33 — τό δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγιείαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῃ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας, τὸ δ’ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς — καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν, &c. The Scholion of Alexander upon this passage is instructive (p. 638, a. Brandis); and a very copious explanation of the whole doctrine is given by M. Brentano, in his valuable treatise, ‘Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles,’ Freiburg, 1862, pp. 85-108-147. Compare Aristotel. Politic. III. i. 9, p. 1275, a. 35.