The distinction drawn by Aristotle between τὸ κοινὸν κατ’ ἰδέαν and τὸ κοινὸν κατ’ ἀναλογίαν — between τὰ κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν λεγόμενα, and τὰ πρὸς ἓν or πρὸς μίαν φύσιν λεγόμενα — this distinction corresponds in part to that which is drawn by Dr. Whewell between classes which are given by Definition, and natural groups which are given by Type. “Such a natural group” (says Dr. Whewell) “is steadily fixed, though not precisely limited; it is given, though not circumscribed; it is determined, not by a boundary but by a central point within, &c.” The coincidence between this doctrine and the Aristotelian is real, though only partial: τὸ πρῶτον φίλον, τὸ πρῶτον ὁρεκτόν, may be considered as types of objects loveable, objects desirable, &c., but ἡ ὑγιεία cannot be considered as a type of τὰ ὑγιεινὰ nor ἡ ἰατρικὴ as a type of τὰ ἰατρικά, though it is “the central point“ to which all things so called are referred. See Dr. Whewell’s doctrine stated in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, i. 476-477; and the comments of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the doctrine — ‘System of Logic,’ Book iv. ch. 7. I have adverted to this same doctrine in remarking on the Hippias Major, [supra, p. 47]; also on the Philêbus, infra, [chap. 32], vol. III.
[46] This is attested by Aristotle, Eth. Nik. i. 64, p. 1096, a. 16. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην, οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον· διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον: compare Ethic. Eudem. i. 8, 1218, a. 2. He goes on to object that Plato, having laid this down as a general principle, departed from it in recognizing an ἰδέαν ἀγαθοῦ, because τἀγαθὸν was predicated in all the categories, in that of οὐσία as well as in that of πρός τι — τὸ δὲ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι — ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα.
Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not member of a generic family.
Now the Πρῶτον φίλον or Primum Amabile which we find in the Lysis, is described as the principium or initial root of one of these imperfectly united aggregates; ramifying into many branches more or less distant, in obedience to one or other of the different laws of association. Aristotle expresses the same idea in another form of words: instead of a Primum Amabile, he gives us a Prima Amicitia — affirming that the diversities of friendship are not species comprehended under the same genus, but gradations or degeneracies departing in one direction or other from the First or pure Friendship. The Primum Amabile, in Plato’s view, appears to be the Good, though he does not explicitly declare it: the Prima Amicitia, with Aristotle, is friendship subsisting between two good persons, who have had sufficient experience to know, esteem, and trust, each other.[47]
[47] Aristotel. Eth. Nikom. viii. 2, 1155, b. 12, viii. 5, 1157, a. 30, viii. 4; Eth. Eudem. vii. 2, 1236, a. 15. The statement is more full in the Eudemian Ethics than in the Nikomachean; he begins the seventh book by saying that φιλία is not said μοναχῶς but πλεοναχῶς; and in p. 1236 he says Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μητε καθ’ ἓν ἁπάσας μηθ’ ὡς εἴδη ἑνὸς γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως· πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν, &c. The whole passage is instructive, but is too long to cite.
Bonitz gives some good explanations of these passages. Observationes Criticæ in Aristotelis quæ feruntur Magna Moralia et Eudemia, pp. 55-57.
The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment.
In regard to the Platonic Lysis, I have already observed that no positive result can be found in it, and that all the hypotheses broached are successively negatived. What is kept before the reader’s mind, however, more than anything else, though not embodied in any distinct formula, is — The Good and the Beautiful considered as objects of love or attachment.