On hearing this, Sokrates — under the suspicion (he tells us) that Protagoras wanted to show off in the presence of Prodikus and Hippias — proposes to convene all the dispersed guests, and to talk in their hearing. This is accordingly done, and the conversation recommences — Sokrates repeating the introductory request which he had preferred on behalf of Hippokrates.
Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as virtuous citizens.
Sokr. — Hippokrates is anxious to distinguish himself in the city, and thinks that he shall best attain this end by placing himself under your instruction. He would gladly learn, Protagoras, what will happen to him, if he comes into intercourse with you. Prot. — Young man, if you come to me, on the day of your first visit, you will go home better than you came, and on the next day the like: each successive day you will make progress for the better.[21] Sokr. — Of course he will; there is nothing surprising in that: but towards what, and about what, will he make progress? Prot. — Your question is a reasonable one, and I am glad to reply to it. I shall not throw him back — as other Sophists do, with mischievous effect — into the special sciences, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, &c., just after he has completed his course in them. I shall teach him what he really comes to learn: wisdom and good counsel, both respecting his domestic affairs, that he may manage his own family well — and respecting the affairs of the city, that he may address himself to them most efficaciously, both in speech and act. Sokr. — You speak of political or social science. You engage to make men good citizens. Prot. — Exactly so.[22]
[21] Plato, Protag. p. 318 A. “Qui ad philosophorum scholas venit, quotidie secum aliquid boni ferat: aut sanior domum redeat, aut sanabilior.” Seneca, Epistol. 108, p. 530.
[22] Plato, Protag. pp. 318-319.
The declaration made by Protagoras — that he will not throw back his pupils into the special arts — is represented by Plato as intended to be an indirect censure on Hippias, then sitting by.
Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not.
Sokr. — That is a fine talent indeed, which you possess, if you do possess it; for (to speak frankly) I thought that the thing had not been teachable, nor intentionally communicable, by man to man.[23] I will tell you why I think so. The Athenians are universally recognised as intelligent men. Now when our public assembly is convened, if the subject of debate be fortification, ship-building, or any other specialty which they regard as learnable and teachable, they will listen to no one except a professional artist or craftsman.[24] If any non-professional man presumes to advise them on the subject, they refuse to hear him, however rich and well-born he may be. It is thus that they act in matters of any special art;[25] but when the debate turns upon the general administration of the city, they hear every man alike — the brass-worker, leather-cutter, merchant, navigator, rich, poor, well-born, low-born, &c. Against none of them is any exception taken, as in the former case — that he comes to give advice on that which he has not learnt, and on which he has had no master.[26] It is plain that the public generally think it not teachable. Moreover our best and wisest citizens, those who possess civic virtue in the highest measure, cannot communicate to their own children this same virtue, though they cause them to be taught all those accomplishments which paid masters can impart. Periklês and others, excellent citizens themselves, have never been able to make any one else excellent, either in or out of their own family. These reasons make me conclude that social or political virtue is not teachable. I shall be glad if you can show me that it is so.[27]
[23] Plato, Protag. p. 319 B. οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι, μηδ’ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις.
[24] Plato, Protag. p. 319 C. καὶ τἄλλα πάντα οὕτως, ὅσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητά τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι. ἐάν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, &c.