[28] Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A.
Μανθάνω, ἂν ἴσως φαίη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅτι πάλαι αἰσχύνεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς φάναι καλὰς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ οὐ τοῦτο ἠρώτων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὃ, τι ἔστιν.
[29] Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.
[30] Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between Sokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms that he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is not true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are Both, even in number, while each is One, an odd number. You cannot say of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he is Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of either but not true of the two together, or vice versâ; some again which are true of the two and true also of each one — such as just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.
[31] Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα ἑπομένῃ ᾦμην, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά ἐστι καλά, ταύτῃ δεῖν αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα ἀπολειπομένῃ μή. καὶ ἕτι νῦν οἶομαι.
Answer — There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures — upon this ground they are called beautiful.
Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. The pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.[32] It is for this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is profitable pleasure — or pleasure producing good — for the profitable is, that which produces good.[33]
[32] Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. ὅτι ἀσινέσταται αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν εἰσι καὶ βέλτισται, καὶ ἀμφότεραι καὶ ἑκατέρα.
[33] Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. λέγετε δὴ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον.
This will not hold — the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good — to say that the beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has been already declared inadmissible.