Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He will tell us — You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing good. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause is different from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the Beautiful is different from the good: or, in other words, the Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful — if each of them is a different thing.[34] Now these propositions we have already pronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will not stand better than the preceding.
[34] Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E — 304 A. Οὔκουν ὠφέλιμον, φήσει, τὸ ποιοῦν τἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ ποιούμενον, ἕτερον νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰς τὸν πρότερον λόγον ἥκει ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη καλὸν οὔτε τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἑκάτερόν ἐστιν.
These last words deserve attention, because they coincide with the doctrine ascribed to Antisthenes, which has caused so many hard words to be applied to him (as well as to Stilpon) by critics, from Kolôtes downwards. The general principle here laid down by Plato is — A is something different from B, therefore A is not B and B is not A. In other words, A cannot be predicated of B nor B of A. Antisthenes said in like manner — Ἄνθρωπος and Ἀγαθὸς are different from each other, therefore you cannot say Ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν ἀγαθός. You can only say Ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν Ἄνθρωπος — Ἀγαθός ἐστιν ἀγαθός.
I have touched farther upon this point in my chapter upon Antisthenes and the other Viri Sokratici.
Remarks upon the Dialogue — the explanations ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept.
Thus finish the three distinct explanations of Τὸ καλὸν, which Plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by Sokrates, successively accepted by Hippias, and successively refuted by Sokrates. In comparing them with the three explanations which he puts into the mouth of Hippias, we note this distinction: That the explanations proposed by Hippias are conspicuous particular exemplifications of the Beautiful, substituted in place of the general concept: as we remarked, in the Dialogue Euthyphron, that the explanations of the Holy given by Euthyphron in reply to Sokrates, were of the same exemplifying character. On the contrary, those suggested by Sokrates keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a derivative or a modification, so as to render a definition of it practicable. To illustrate this difference by the language of Dr. Whewell respecting many of the classifications in Natural History, we may say — That according to the views here represented by Hippias, the group of objects called beautiful is given by Type, not by Definition:[35] while Sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some common characteristic attribute may be found, on which to rest a Definition. To search for Definitions of general words, was (as Aristotle remarks) a novelty, and a valuable novelty, introduced by Sokrates. His contemporaries, the Sophists among them, were not accustomed to it: and here the Sophist Hippias (according to Plato’s frequent manner) is derided as talking nonsense,[36] because, when asked for an explanation of The Self-Beautiful, he answers by citing special instances of beautiful objects. But we must remember, first, that Sokrates, who is introduced as trying several general explanations of the Self-Beautiful, does not find one which will stand: next, that even if one such could be found, particular instances can never be dispensed with, in the way of illustration; lastly, that there are many general terms (the Beautiful being one of them) of which no definitions can be provided, and which can only be imperfectly explained, by enumerating a variety of objects to which the term in question is applied.[37] Plato thought himself entitled to objectivise every general term, or to assume a substantive Ens, called a Form or Idea, corresponding to it. This was a logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been committed by Hippias or any other Sophist. The assumption that wherever there is a general term, there must also be a generic attribute corresponding to it — is one which Aristotle takes much pains to negative: he recognises terms of transitional analogy, as well as terms equivocal: while he also especially numbers the Beautiful among equivocal terms.[38]
[35] See Dr. Whewell’s ‘History of the Inductive Sciences,’ ii. 120 seq.; and Mr. John Stuart Mill’s ‘System of Logic,’ iv. 8, 3.
I shall illustrate this subject farther when I come to the dialogue called [Lysis].
[36] Stallbaum, in his notes, bursts into exclamations of wonder at the incredible stupidity of Hippias — “En hominis stuporem prorsus admirabilem,” p. 289 E.