Sokr. — You are about to step forward as adviser of the public assembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points which you know better than they? Alk. — Of course. Sokr. — All that you know, has been either learnt from others or found out by yourself. Alk. — Certainly. Sokr. — But you would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing, without the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no such desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know already. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when you believed yourself not to know? Alk. — Necessarily so. Sokr. — Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware, consists of three things — letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters, or about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? Alk. — Neither of the three. Sokr. — Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to give advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about architecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to deliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to professional men — architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be poor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not then, upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel? Alk. — When they are debating about affairs of their own.
Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight — to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust.
Sokr. — But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. Alk. — When they are discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the city. Sokr. — You mean when they are discussing the question with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? But it is certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight — also when it is best — and as long as it is best. Alk. — Certainly. Sokr. — Now, if the Athenians wished to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was best which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or the professional trainer? Alk. — The trainer, undoubtedly. Sokr. — So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when you talk about better, in wrestling or singing, what standard do you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art? Alk. — Yes. Sokr. — Answer me in like manner about war or peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen, whom, and at what periods, it is better to fight, and better not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by better? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?[3] Alk. — I cannot say. Sokr. — But is it not a disgrace, since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom it is better for them to war, — not to be able to say to what end your better refers? Do not you know what are the usual grounds and complaints urged when war is undertaken? Alk. — Yes: complaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured. Sokr. — Under what circumstances? Alk. — You mean, whether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference. Sokr. — Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? Alk. — The question is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It would be neither lawful nor honourable. Sokr. — Then when you spoke about better, in reference to war or peace, what you meant was juster — you had in view justice and injustice? Alk. — It seems so.
[3] Plato, Alkib. i. 108 E – 109 A.
ἴθι δή, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην ἄγειν, τοῦτο τὸ βέλτιον τί ὀνομάζεις; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ ἔλεγες τὸ ἄμεινον, ὅτι μουσικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτερῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον· πειρῶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τὸ βέλτιον.… πρὸς τί τεινει τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἄγειν ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν οἷς δεῖ; Alkib. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι.
How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he always knew it, even as a boy.
Sokr. — How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt, to distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master, without my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce me to him, that I also may learn it from him. Alk. — You are jesting. Sokr. — Not at all: I love you too well to jest. Alk. — But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice and injustice, without a master? Sokr. — Certainly: you might find out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this you would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did not already know. Alk. — Was there not a time when I really believed myself not to know it? Sokr. — Perhaps there may have been: tell me when that time was. Was it last year? Alk. — No: last year I thought that I knew. Sokr. — Well, then two years, three years, &c., ago? Alk. — No: the case was the same then, also, I thought that I knew. Sokr. — But before that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys, for acting unjustly towards you. Alk. — Certainly: I was not then ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting unjustly towards me. Sokr. — You knew, then, even in your boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? Alk. — Certainly: I knew even then. Sokr. — At what moment did you first find it out? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time was there when you did not believe yourself to know? Alk. — Upon my word, I cannot say.
Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek. — The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself.
Sokr. — Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or injustice at all, or from what quarter? Alk. — I was mistaken in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from the multitude.[4] Sokr. — Your teachers are none of the best: no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at draughts: much less, what is just and unjust. Alk. — I learnt it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had any special teacher. Sokr. — Of that the multitude are competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree or a stone, — a horse or a man, — you get the same answer from every one. But when you ask not simply which are horses, but also which horses are fit to run well in a race — when you ask not merely about which are men, but which men are healthy or unhealthy — are the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer? Alk. — Assuredly not. Sokr. — When you see the multitude differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not competent to teach others. Alk. — It is so. Sokr. — Now, about the question, What is just and unjust — are the multitude all of one mind, or do they differ among themselves? Alk. — They differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about health and sickness.[5] Sokr. How, then, can we say that the multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely dispute about it among themselves? Alk. — I now perceive that we cannot say so. Sokr. — How can we say, therefore, that they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who have learnt from no other teachers? Alk. — From what you say, it is impossible.
[4] Plato, Alkib. i. 110 D-E. ἔμαθον, οἶμαι, καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι … παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν.