[5] Plato, Alkib. i. 112 A. Sokr. Τί δὲ δὴ; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων, οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσί σοι ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις; Alkib. Ἥκιστα, νὴ Δί’, ὦ Σώκρατες. Sokr. Τί δέ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν διαφέρεσθαι; Alkib. πολύ γε.
Sokr. — No: not from what I say, but from what you say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give all the answers.[6] And what you have said amounts to this — that Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself?
[6] Plato, Alkib. i. 112-113.
Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust — which they consider plain to every one — but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but question.
Alk. — But, Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident; they debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice and expediency do not do not always coincide. Many persons commit great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so: others again behave justly, and suffer from it.[7] Sokr — Do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt — or when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner. But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and expediency are not coincident. Persuade me of this, by interrogating me as I interrogated you. Alk. — That is beyond my power. Sokr. — But when you rise to address the assembly, you will have to persuade them. If you can persuade them, you can persuade me. Assume me to be the assembly, and practise upon me.[8] Alk. — You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is for you to speak and prove the point. Sokr — No: I can only question: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the point is determined by your own answers.[9]
[7] Plato, Alkib. i. 113 D. Οἶμαι μὲν ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βουλεύεσθαι πότερα δικαιότερα ἢ ἀδικωτερα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγοῦνται δῆλα εἶναι, &c.
[8] Plato, Alkib. i. 114 B-C. This same argument is addressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 14-15.
[9] Plato, Alkib. i. 114 E.
Οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγεις ὅτι ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴης πεπεισμένος;
Comment on the preceding — Sokratic method — the respondent makes the discoveries for himself.