Sokr. — Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best distinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or many? Erast. — It is so.[17] Sokr. — The art or science, whereby men punish evil-doers rightly, is the judicial or justice: and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad, either one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself, whether he be a good or a bad man? Erast. — Yes: he is. Sokr. — To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in sobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate. But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly — or justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the Delphian rescript, Know thyself, does in fact enjoin the practice both of justice and of sobriety.[18] Erast. — So it appears. Sokr. — Now it is by this same art, when practised by a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed; it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master, that the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman, house-master.[19] Erast. — I admit it.
[17] Plato, Erast. 137 C-D.
[18] Plato, Erast. 138 A.
[19] Plato, Erast. 138 C.
In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, competent to talk — but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competent to act.
Sokr. — Now let me ask you. You said that it was discreditable for the philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other craftsman talking about matters of his own craft, not to be able to follow what he said and comment upon it. Would it not also be discreditable to the philosopher, when listening to any king, judge, or house-master, about professional affairs, not to be able to understand and comment? Erast. — Assuredly it would be most discreditable upon matters of such grave moment. Sokr. — Shall we say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the philosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate performer, useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand? or shall we not rather affirm, that he must not confide his own house to any one else, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well administered? Erast. — That too I admit.[20] Sokr. — Farther, if his friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes, — if the city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any difficulty, — in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to stand second or third, and not to be first-rate? Erast. — I think it will be. Sokr. — You see then, my friend, philosophy is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with multifarious arts or sciences.[21]
[20] Plato, Erast. 138 E. Πότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον, τὰ δευτερεῖα ἔχοντα πάντων, τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν τούτων τις ᾖ; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἀλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδε τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία;
[21] Plato, Erast. 139 A. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμάθειά τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.
Close of the dialogue — humiliation of the literary Erastes.
Upon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the conversation) the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held his peace; while the gymnastic rival declared that I was in the right, and the other hearers also commended what I had said.