Remarks — animated manner of the dialogue.
The antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philosophy, — and the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot explain what it is — gives much point and vivacity to this short dialogue. This last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and confident; thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating cross-examination put upon him by Sokrates to the satisfaction of his stupid rival. Moreover, the dramatic introduction is full of animation, like that of the Charmidês and Lysis.
Besides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for discussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all times been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before Sokrates — probably no one before Plato — ever sought a definition of it. In no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a special topic of research.
Definition of philosophy — here sought for the first time — Platonic conception of measure — referee not discovered.
It is here handled in Plato’s negative, elenchtic, tentative, manner. By some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as equivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least Plato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist, contrary to the opinion of Protagoras.[22] The exception taken by Sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be measured, introduces that governing idea of τὸ μέτριον (the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which Plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The conception of a measure, of a standard of measurement — and of conformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and desirable — stands prominent in his mind,[23] though it is not always handled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiadês, indicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best: without which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be hurtful rather than useful.[24] Plato considers that this Measure is neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained intelligence. In the Erastæ as elsewhere, such an intelligence is called for in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental training — neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To suggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to leave it unanswered — is a practice familiar with Plato. In this respect the Erastæ is like other dialogues. The answer, if any, intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence is the philosopher himself.
[22] Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare too, the Platonic dialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.
[23] See about ἡ τοῦ μετρίου φύσις as οὐσία — as ὄντως γιγνόμενον. — Plato, Politikus, 283-284. Compare also the Philêbus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp. 356-357, where ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη is declared to be the principal saviour of life and happiness.
[24] Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, [ch. xii. p. 16.]
View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner.