The second explanation of philosophy here given — that the philosopher is one who is second-best in many departments, and a good talker upon all, but inferior to the special master in each — was supposed by Thrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at Demokritus. By many Platonic critics, it is referred to those persons whom they single out to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether intended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the persons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by the word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty as characteristic features of the Athenian citizen — referred chiefly to the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one for talking over every thing before it was done, yet accompanied with full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.[25] Speech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many different topics — was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge acquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one indiscriminately, and upon each man’s particular subject; often perplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts conversations with various professional men — a painter, a sculptor, an armourer — and informs us that it was instructive to all of them, though Sokrates was no practitioner in any craft.[26] It was not merely Demokritus, but Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every subject included in contemporary observation. The voluminous works of Aristotle, — the Timæus, Republic, and Leges, of Plato, — embrace a large variety of subjects, on each of which, severally taken, these two great men were second-best or inferior to some special proficient. Yet both of them had judgments to give, which it was important to hear, upon all subjects:[27] and both of them could probably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself. Aristotle, for example, would write better upon rhetoric than Demosthenes — upon tragedy, than Sophokles. Undoubtedly, if an oration or a tragedy were to be composed — if resolution or action were required on any real state of particular circumstances — the special proficient would be called upon to act: but it would be a mistake to infer from hence, as the Platonic Sokrates intimates in the Erastæ, that the second-best, or theorizing reasoner, was a useless man. The theoretical and critical point of view, with the command of language apt for explaining and defending it, has a value of its own; distinct from, yet ultimately modifying and improving, the practical. And such comprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects, without having the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of them, deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence whether it be adopted as the definition of a philosopher, or not.
[25] Thucyd. ii. 39 fin. — 40. καὶ ἔν τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις. φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ’ εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας, &c., and the remarkable sequel of the same chapter about the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic action in the Athenian character.
[26] Xen. Mem. iii. 10; iii. 11; iii. 12.
[27] The πένταθλος or ὕπακρος whom Plato criticises in this dialogue, coincides with what Aristotle calls “the man of universal education or culture”. — Ethic. Nikom. I. i. 1095, a. 1. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γιγνώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής· καθ’ ἕκαστον ἄρα, ὁ πεπαιδευμένος· ἁπλῶς δέ, ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.
Plato’s view — that the philosopher has a province special to himself, distinct from other specialties — dimly indicated — regal or political art.
Plato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher in the same way as Sokrates. The close of the Erastæ is employed in opening a distant and dim view of the Platonic conception. We are given to understand, that the philosopher has a province of his own, wherein he is not second-best, but a first-rate actor and adviser. To indicate, in many different ways, that there is or must be such a peculiar, appertaining to philosophy — distinct from, though analogous to, the peculiar of each several art — is one leading purpose in many Platonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher? Here, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not as by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here, we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil, governing, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme art or science, of which the philosopher is the professor; and in which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only person competent both to advise and to act: the art which exercises control over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what occasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy, looked at in one of its two aspects: not as a body of speculative truth, to be debated, proved, and discriminated from what cannot be proved or can be disproved — but as a critical judgment bearing on actual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular cases, with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as expetenda.[28] This is what Plato understands by the measuring or calculating art, the regal or political art, according as we use the language of the Protagoras, Politikus, Euthydêmus, Republic. Both justice and sobriety are branches of this art; and the distinction between the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a whole — as we find both in the Erastæ and in the Republic.[29]
[28] The difference between the second explanation of philosophy and the third explanation, suggested in the Erastæ, will be found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which Aristotle takes much pains to draw between σοφία and φρόνησις. — Ethic. Nikomach. vi. 5, pp. 1140-1141; also Ethic. Magn. i. pp. 1197-1198.
[29] See Republic, iv. 433 A; Gorgias, 526 C; Charmidês 164 B; and Heindorf’s note on the passage in the Charmidês.
Philosopher — the supreme artist controlling other artists.
Here, in the Erastæ, this conception of the philosopher as the supreme artist controlling all other artists, is darkly indicated and crudely sketched. We shall find the same conception more elaborately illustrated in other dialogues; yet never passing out of that state.